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ANGOLA: OPTIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing day: February 18, 1986	1
Statement of:	
Crocker, Hon. Chester A., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State	3
Moose, Hon. Richard M., vice president, Shearon/Lehman Bros	26
Henriksen, Thomas H., Senior Research Feilow, the Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA	30

APPENDIX

Prepared statement of:	
Chester A. Crocker	40
Richard M. Moose	50
Thomas H. Henriksen	60
Insertions for the record:	
No Meddling in Angola (Los Angeles Times, Sunday, December 8, 1985)	67
Using Savimbi to Stop Moscow (New York Times, Thursday, January 30, 1986)	68
Rhetoric and Reality (New York Times, Monday, January 27, 1986)	69
The Selling of Jonas Savimbi: Success and a $600,000 Tab (the Washington Post, February 9, 1986)	70
Time is Running Out for UNITA (the Washington Times, Friday, December 20, 1985)	74
Why We Should Aid Savimbi (the Washington Times, Friday, February 7, 1986)	75

ANGOLA: OPTIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, at 11:20 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Kassebaum, Pressler, Trible, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today's hearing on American policy options toward Angola is the second the committee has held this year on this subject. We heard classified testimony from the administration on January 30, 1986.

Our witnesses this morning are Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to be followed by Richard Moose, former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs under the Carter administration, and Thomas Henriksen, associate director of the Hoover Institution.

The committee has had referred to it a resolution introduced by the distinguished majority leader Robert Dole. In addition, Senator John East has introduced a bill that was referred to us to provide overt military assistance to UNITA, while Senator Paul Trible of our committee has introduced yet another bill that would provide overt humanitarian assistance to UNITA.

It is possible that in the near future the committee may wish to schedule a markup on one or all of these proposals.

The Cuban intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975 was considered by many to have signaled the end of United States efforts of the 1970's to promote détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, under three Presidents, has refused to recognize the MPLA regime in Luanda because of the presence of these troops, which have enabled an unpopular and unrepresentative government to maintain its control over the principal cities and petroleum industry of Angola.

Despite increasing popular antagonism toward the MPLA government in Luanda and military gains by UNITA over the past 4 years, the MPLA remains firmly committed to seeking a military, rather than a negotiated, settlement to the civil war.

The number of Cuban troops has almost doubled in the past 5 years, raising serious concerns in this country and in neighboring

African states about the threat these troops represent to the region.

I am sure that all of us share the objective of promoting a peaceful resolution of the Angolan, civil war. We would like to see a settlement that will enable Angola to move rapidly to the economic prosperity and social progress which oil revenues would enable it to enjoy, a settlement in which Cuban troops and all other foreign troops are removed permanently from Angola, and a settlement that gives an appropriate voice in the government of the country to all indigenous groups.

How we can best achieve these objectives is the focus of today's hearing.

I know the administration shares these goals with the committee.

Before we hear from our first witness, I would like to ask my colleague, Senator Pell, if he would like to make an opening statement at this point.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very glad you are holding this much needed, open, hearing on American policy toward Angola.

For several weeks, there have been indications that the administration is considering the idea of providing assistance to UNITA, the rebel movement that has been waging a guerrilla war against the Angolan Government for a decade. During the recent visit of UNITA leader Savimbi to Washington, our President confirmed that the United States would be very helpful to UNITA's cause. I have serious misgivings about this course of action.

The administration's stated goals in Southern Africa are to achieve a Namibian settlement in concert with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and to move the South African Government away from apartheid. That aiding UNITA will also promote these goals or serve the interests of the American and Angolan peoples is, I believe, highly questionable. In fact, aiding UNITA is, in my view, likely to escalate the war in Angola, and increase, rather than decrease, Angolan dependency on the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Given UNITA's ties with South Africa, championing UNITA's cause would certainly undermine our antiapartheid efforts and deal a serious blow to our relations with black African nations.

Finally, aiding UNITA threatens to involve our nation in the Angolan civil war, a ghost from the 1970's which had been laid to rest until Congress, unwisely, in my view, repealed the Clark amendment last year.

I hope that Mr. Crocker and our other witnesses will address the issues that have been raised. Moreover, in light of the Gramm-Rudman budget cuts, I would ask that the administration indicate where it expects to find the funds to provide aid to UNITA.

I would also ask unanimous consent to have inserted into the record at this point two articles, one from the Washington Post, entitled "The Selling of Jonas Savingi: Success and a $600,000 Tab—Public Relations Firm Paved Guerrilla's Way," and also an article from the New York Times, by Anthony Lewis, entitled "Angola: War or Diplomacy."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[See appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Do other colleagues have opening comments they would wish to make?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Secretary Crocker, I apologize, and I apologize to the members of this committee for my tardiness. The President has held a meeting this morning to initiate policy consideration of still another area of the world, which will consume committee interest in the future. We shall not dwell on that today but will get back to Angola.

If you could deliver your statement briefly or give a precis of it, we could get into questions immediately and you could make the points that you need to make.

We are glad to have you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to be here to have a chance to talk about the situation in Southwestern Africa, Angola, and neighboring countries, neighboring territories.

The Angola Namibia negotiations form an essential part of our policy for this region. Our objectives are clear: to restore and advance U.S. influence; to deny the Soviets a chance to extend and solidify their own; and, of course, to expand our cooperative relationships with African states.

It is obvious, I believe, to all in this room that our interests and our objectives are not served by a Namibia which is not free, by an Angola which is the scene of continued bloody conflict and foreign intervention. Thus, we have worked hard to bring peace to Angola and independence to Namibia.

In recent years, we have made progress in the pursuit of these goals, and I would like briefly to review where we have come.

In 1981, the start of this administration, there was no peace process underway in Southwestern Africa. The quest for Namibian independence had become moribund, South Africa sat unmovable on its side of the common border between Namibia and Angola, while some 30,000 Cubans sat in Angola. UNITA was fighting in its civil war and no one was really talking.

This situation of blockage posed real dangers to the region and to our interests there.

The absence of a viable Western strategy for Namibian decolonization and the presence of a seemingly permanent Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola risked heightened polarization and open-ended opportunities for Moscow to exploit African frustration over Namibia on the one hand and to fuel internal tensions in Angola and regional tensions across borders throughout Southern Africa on the other.

It was essential that we regain the initiative.

It took roughly 2 years to engage Luanda and Pretoria in a real negotiation. It took another year to begin to erode the mutual mistrust and to build some confidence in our own role as an honest broker. With the Lusaka accords of February 1984, the South Afri-

cans began a process of disengagement of their military presence from Southern Angola in return for restraint by SWAPO.

In November of that same year, the Angolans said they were ready to commit themselves for the first time to a concrete plan, which included the withdrawal of 20,000 Cuban troops over 3 years, starting with the beginning of the implementation of the resolution 435 process, that resolution being the internationally agreed independence plan for Namibia.

While this proposal was, in itself, insufficient to conclude an agreement, it was an important step forward in that for the first time, Luanda had accepted the principle that the independence of Namibia could only take place in the context of Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

It is important to note that by early 1985, we had made real progress in devising and gaining acceptance for a framework for resolving these two questions: Namibian independence and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

I would emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that this progress in the years 1981 to 1985 helped to thwart Soviet goals of advancing its positions in southern Africa. Moscow did not encourage our efforts on Angola, and has clearly been placed on the defensive there by our efforts, as it has in Mozambique and elsewhere in southern Africa.

However, the negotiating process has always moved in fits and starts. It has been characterized by mutual suspicion among the parties to the conflict—South Africa, the MPLA regime, UNITA and SWAPO, and by continuing efforts, sometimes more intense than others, to pursue military options. Moscow, of course, has fueled distrust and fear among the parties.

After we tabled fresh compromise proposals in March 1985, each of the parties pulled back from taking the tough decisions that were needed to advance the process. In South Africa, a government under heavy pressure from internal protests and increasing international isolation pursued other means to accomplish its ends, including greater emphasis on military operations in Angola. The MPLA in Luanda, buoyed by a massive infusion of Soviet arms and Soviet equipment, also retreated from the negotiating path. The result, we have seen, was a major MPLA military thrust into southern Angola in late 1985, which was marked by greater Soviet involvement, and then South African participation in support of UNITA, than had been before.

We believe that fighting brought home to both sides the dangers of escalation. In recent months, we have had several meetings with both the MPLA and the South Africans in which the negotiating context has been further defined. We are not yet at the point of success and, frankly, the prospects in an enterprise of this complexity are always problematical.

These negotiations and the continuing warfare inside Angola and across its borders represent the backdrop against which the visit of Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA took place. Dr. Savimbi's visit generated a lot of public interest and some debate, much of it divorced from the political and military realities of southern Africa. He spoke effectively on his own behalf, and most of you had an opportunity to hear him directly. He returned to Angola with high morale and no doubts about the administration's support for his ef-

forts. We do support UNITA; it has sustained a long and brave fight against Soviet and Cuban political and military designs in his country. Our reception of him here was an element of that support. It sent a strong signal to Luanda and to Moscow that the United States views UNITA as a nationalist organization with legitimate aspirations of playing a role in the process of national reconciliation which must come about if Angola is to achieve real peace.

We intend to be supportive of UNITA in an effective and appropriate manner. As the President said in his State of the Union Message, we want to support all those who are fighting for freedom.

And, as the President said in his important speech to the U.N. General Assembly in October last year, we view the Soviet Union itself as having a responsibility to take action to defuse situations of regional tension which have been made worse by its own policies. We will continue to make that point to Moscow through direct communication and otherwise as well.

Some may perceive that the recent reception Savimbi received here signals a change in U.S. policy. It does not. Our strategy recognizes that the scene on the ground in Angola has changed, largely owing to Soviet actions, and that our ability to respond diplomatically and in other ways has been measurably increased by the repeal of the Clark amendment, effective October 1, 1985. I want, however, to categorically state here that the basis and the goals of our policy remain unchanged: We seek a negotiated solution that will bring independence to Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Such a solution opens the way for Angolans to reconcile and achieve peace amongst themselves.

If I could say just a few further words about the broader context of our policy, we do not believe in the current period that diplomacy and pressure represent polar opposites or alternative strategies. This is also the case in southern Africa where virtually all the parties there pursue their interests through a wide variety of means.

Inevitably, perhaps, both the South Africans and the Angolans are pursuing several tracks of policy to advance their interests. The same can be said about UNITA and the MPLA as they contend over the future of Angola.

For our part, we recognize that our diplomacy plays out against a backdrop of real and tangible pressures that exist on the ground. For the past several years, we have worked to create a political framework for the ultimate resolution of the intertwined problems of Namibia and Angola. As I indicated above, we have had some success, but still have a way to go to achieve our goals.

It remains our analysis that neither the South African Government, nor the Government in Angola, nor SWAPO, nor UNITA can accomplish their goals through outright military victory. The only ones who will benefit from continued warfare are the Soviets and the Cubans. Hence, the continuing relevance of a political framework. That framework offers a context for the multiple political, military, and economic pressures that are at play.

This past year, we have seen the MPLA government, strongly backed by Moscow and Havana, pursue an escalation. They sought to reverse 2 years of UNITA gains and deal a body blow to that movement. They failed.

It is important, in our view, that they continue to fail, just as we are determined that our diplomacy not be used by the South Africans as a cover for the pursuit of other objectives. We feel the same way about the Government in Luanda.

The point I am making, then, is that diplomacy requires to be effective a degree of pressure that drives the parties toward a compromise. But pressures—pure, physical power—does not, in itself, represent solutions and in our analysis, cannot be effective in the absence of a meaningful political context. As Secretary Shultz has put it, it takes both power and diplomacy.

While he was here, Dr. Savimbi stated his view that there is no possibility for either side in Angola to gain an outright military victory and that national reconciliation will have to come about through a process of negotiation. He emphasized that UNITA does not wish to destroy the MPLA. UNITA, he stated, seeks to convince the leaders in Luanda of the need to compromise and to reach a political settlement.

We share Dr. Savimbi's belief that there are no military solutions in Angola. He affirmed to us his support for our efforts which focus on the related questions of resolution 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal, to provide the necessary political context for reconciliation in Angola.

Mr. Chairman, it is appropriate that this committee review the situation in Angola and United States policy in that troubled part of the world. It is, of course, up to the committee to decide what position it wishes to take.

I would like to suggest, however, that America's best interests would be served by a clear statement from Congress that this country is committed to negotiated solutions in southern Africa, but that our willingness to negotiate should not be used by others to pursue their own aggressive ends.

In this regard, and keeping in mind the words of Dr. Savimbi when he visited here, I think it is important that our Government, both the executive and legislative branches, make clear that we support those who fight for freedom and political solutions. How that support should be manifested is a topic for further legislative-executive cooperation and consultation.

I thank you for your attention and look forward to answering your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much Secretary Crocker.

The Chair would suggest that there are probably many members who want to ask questions. We will put a 10-minute time limit on questions, but will hope that members will not want to take all of the 10 minutes so that we can move on to our next witnesses, who have been patiently waiting their turn.

I want to defer my questions and yield to the distinguished chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, Senator Kassebaum, for questions she may wish to ask.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to ask Mr. Crocker how strong a factor do you think this aid would be in moving the MPLA to serious negotiations.

Is this the purpose of aid to UNITA?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, Senator; that is indeed the purpose of our efforts; to make it clear, by sending clear signals, that, as I said in my formal comments, we do not want to have our diplomacy used by others as a cover for the pursuit of outright military solutions.

So it is a signal of support. It is a morale booster, if you will, as well for the people in UNITA. But, above all, I think it is an indication that we are not going to stand by with our arms folded in the event that the other side in this negotiation tries to deal with the problem in a purely military fashion.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Dr. Savimbi has also said that negotiations and reconciliation were what he believed were important.

What I guess I am asking you is this. From your analysis of the situation, how long do you think it will take to reach a point where there will be serious negotiations, and do you believe this is indeed what will occur?

Mr. CROCKER. It's difficult to predict how long it will take. There have been spurts, where we have had progress and success, and then there have been periods when people have pulled back.

We have seen some indications in recent months that the parties, having looked at the kind of escalation that occurred last fall, may wish to have a fresh look at the viability of the negotiating track and to give it a bit more attention than they had been giving it in the preceding months.

But I think it is our view that this is a way, in fact, to reinvigorate these negotiations at a time when there have been a number of months where time passed, where we had positions and proposals on the table and the parties were simply distracted and were not answering the mail.

We had a period of as long as 8 or 10 months in which proposals were not given serious attention of a kind that is obviously required if we are going to make urgent progress.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Following the Lusaka Accord.

Mr. CROCKER. No, I am referring to the period of time, really, since February and March 1985, when we put our own compromise ideas on the table as a means of accelerating things, and perhaps the parties on both sides took a look at those ideas and were somewhat intimidated by them and pulled back.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Having seen that happen on several occasions, do you think it is realistic to assume that it will be different in the future? It seems to me that once the stakes go up a notch, then the playing field becomes very different.

I wonder if we are being realistic about how this will work, to the benefit not only of Dr. Savimbi and UNITA but our interests in the region as well.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, we see the need to reinforce what we have been doing all along. We have, if you will, some fresh tools to work with. We believe that this can, in fact, strengthen what we have been trying to do all along.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Which fresh tools, for instance?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I referred in my testimony to the repeal of the Clark amendment itself sending a powerful signal, and decisions are being taken. I think that is an important signal to be sending.

Again, I would emphasize that what we are saying to all the parties—and we are meeting with the Angolan officials as we have been meeting with people from UNITA and South Africa on a regular basis. These negotiation continue.

What we are emphasizing is that our goal is a negotiated solution, and no one has asked us to date to end our efforts. We don't see any evidence that they will. On the contrary, it perhaps may serve to get some people's attention.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You talked about the Lusaka Accord. What do you feel was the reason that there was a significant shift from a diplomatic approach which the MPLA had seemed to be pursuing to a military one?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, there were a number of factors, Senator, that seemed to affect the nature of decisionmaking in Luanda. On the one hand, without any question, the Soviets encouraged the authorities in Luanda to acquire a significant further amount of sophisticated hardware, and, of course, they were paying clients, so that may have been a factor. But, in any event, there was this open encouragement from their principal superpower friend to pursue the military track. So, that is clearly a factor.

There may have been a sense that because of the difficulties in South Africa perhaps this would change the entire equation from the standpoint of Luanda. There may have been a real misreading of the staying power of the South African regime in a military sense, an effort to sort of see if they could not do it unilaterally, solve their UNITA problem unilaterally on a military basis. There were a number of factors of that kind.

The Angolans also pointed to South African cross-border raids as implying that there was no basis for confidence and trust and a series of things of that kind.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you think sanctions against the government of Angola would be effective?

Mr. CROCKER. I think we have to keep our policy under review and based on events as they develop on the ground. That is what we are trying to do.

We will look at things as they develop, rather than try to make decisions of that kind in a vacuum.

We, of course, have no diplomatic relations with that government, as you know. This administration has not developed such relations, just as our predecessors did not either.

There is trade, and we have not to date inhibited such trade. It is an important commercial relationship and that continues.

But we have not addressed that issue and we have not made any decisions in that regard.

Senator KASSEBAUM. There is strong feeling by some, as you know, that American companies doing business very successfully in the oil industry in Angola should be pressured to withdraw.

Mr. CROCKER. We have maintained a continuous dialog with the major companies who are involved in Angola, pointing out to them the obvious fact that yes, as they know better than we, there are attractive commercial opportunities there, recognizing with them the fact that if they do not participate, others will, which is a very real factor in our thinking; also pointing out that we have strategic objectives here which they should be keeping in mind; that there is

a war underway; that they are living in an environment of real risk. We have been urging them to think and hopefully to encourage what we are trying to achieve.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Those are all the questions I have at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is important that we look at the background of why we are where we are.

Would it be a correct statement to say that the Cubans came into Angola in-response to an Angolan appeal for help against the South Africans?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator Pell, when the Cubans came into Angola, there was not any Angolan Government. There was a situation of different movements jockeying for power, right before the Portuguese departure, and the Portuguese had sort of cut their losses and pulled in their horns, so that it was a free-for-all. The Cubans came in and the South Africans came in.

Senator PELL. Who came in first?

Mr. CROCKER. There is a lot of debate about that.

There clearly was a pattern of reciprocal intervention. But I think one would have to go into great detail to get exactly which was the first side to put one person on the ground who was in uniform.

Senator PELL. In your view, who came in first or when were the first massive incursions? Was it by the South Africans first or the Cubans?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, my information, my historical memory on this—and it is going back 11 years, now, Senator, so you will have to bear with me—there was clear evidence of a Soviet-Cuban decision to become involved through advisors and small numbers of personnel before the major incursions took place by South Africa and Cuba in October 1975. Each, of course, blamed the other.

But we saw, I think the U.S. Government at the time saw that the Soviets and the Cubans were, in fact, becoming involved in a military sense well before that.

Senator PELL. In other words, it was probably about the same in time?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I think at the time the United States Government felt that it was responding to a Soviet-Cuban involvement of a sort in the earlier months of 1975. By the time you saw conventional units of the South Africans come in and conventional Cuban units come in, that was several months later. That was in the fall of 1975.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Now, Savimbi, I notice that you refer to him as Doctor Savimbi. Is he a medical doctor or is he a Ph.D.?

Mr. CROCKER. I think he has the same kind of doctorate I do, Senator. It is a Ph.D.-type; yes.

Senator PELL. A Ph.D.? I was checking this out and I understood that it was a bachelor's degree from Lausanne.

In any case, I believe when he was here he said he did not need any help to get weapons because he had an ample supply of funds himself.

If that is correct, why are we discussing the question of military aid to Savimbi?

Mr. CROCKER. I didn't hear him say that he had plenty of money himself to buy all he needs. I don't think that really is the case.

Senator PELL. Didn't he indicate that he really did not need American aid because he had more than enough funds to buy the necessary military equipment to meet the predicted offensive?

Mr. CROCKER. I don't know what it is you are quoting from, Senator.

Senator PELL. Another question I would like to ask you.

Do you consider it correct for Savimbi to threaten retaliation against the Gulf/Chevron facilities in Angola if they continue to lobby and oppose aid to Savimbi? This would then mean that we are encouraging operations that can result in the blowing up of an American refinery?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we have made it very clear, both publicly and in our discussions with UNITA that obviously any American Government attaches real importance to the safety of Americans abroad and, for that matter, American facilities. We have underscored that message.

I think the most recent words that I have heard from UNITA on this subject is that they would hope that the oil companies and others would not take sides in the Angolan conflict. But the last I heard was they were not asking Gulf/Chevron to pull out.

Senator PELL. But doesn't it seem odd that oil companies can be there, doing business, apparently needing protection against UNITA at the same time we are helping UNITA?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, we are clearly not going to be encouraging the kind of activity that your initial question would suggest, Senator. That is not our policy.

The bulk of the fighting in Angola, I would stress, and the major theater of the escalation that we have seen has been in the southeastern part of the country, the home-base area of UNITA where, with a lot of Soviet advice and help, there has been the establishment of a significantly higher technology deployed against UNITA in the form of armored vehicles and tanks, in the form of helicopters and jet aircraft, as well as sophisticated air defense equipment.

This, I think, is where the focal point really will be.

Senator PELL. Going back to the Cuban troops that are there, do you think that, if they were pulled out, there would be true reconciliation, or do you think that they are there to stay?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I feel our opportunity is to work on the obvious fact that the Angolans remain in a sense dependent, but eager to escape that dependence—many of them.

We have seen so much evidence of it ourselves, that the Cubans are there because of a certain temporary requirement, but that they are not loved, that they live high off the land, that they do not, in fact, engage in some of the fighting that one might have expected them to. They are not seeking to increase their own body count. As I said, they do pretty well and they live pretty well in a very, very poor country.

The same applies, to an extent, to the Soviet Union, which has helped to badly damage Angola's ocean fisheries and seems to be living off the relationship.

So, we believe that there is an opportunity to get the Cubans out and to reduce Soviet influence there; yes.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in a matter of this sort, if you are a few minutes late, you run the risk of covering the same ground that already has been covered. If I do that, just summarize and we will move along.

Were you asked or did you comment on when the effective and appropriate U.S. support for Dr. Savimbi will begin?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I was not asked that question, but decisions are being made, and in some cases have been made, and we want to be relevant, effective, and appropriate, and that means as soon as we can.

Senator HELMS. Well, that's a little vague. It's a fact, isn't it, that the Soviets and the Cubans are planning a spring offensive against Dr. Savimbi in March or April. Is that not true?

Mr. CROCKER. We expect that the rainy season will come to an end in April to May of this year. Based on past performance, government offensives have begun to get organized at around that time. Whether they are likely to see their peak as early as April remains to be seen.

But, clearly, we are aware of the possible scenario that you are pointing to, of a return to an active offensive as early as April.

Senator HELMS. Well, that means as soon as you can. It means also that you had better get cracking if you are really genuine about wanting to help the freedom fighters and Dr. Savimbi.

Will this aid include weapons which are effective against the main threat to Dr. Savimbi's freedom fighters? I mean by this effective against Soviet tanks, helicopter gunships, and MIG fighters?

I do not need to tell you, Mr. Secretary, that such weapons do not have to be of U.S. origin. For example, there are any number of European manufactured systems—French, British, Swedish—that would be effective.

Would this aid, direct or indirect, include the weapons that they really need to win if the intent is to win?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we want to be effective, and that obviously covers the ground that you have covered in your question. I cannot really go beyond that, I do not believe. But we are aware of what "effective" means in this context.

There is such a thing as moral support, there is such a thing as material support. We want to do both, and we want to be effective and relevant to the problem that Dr. Savimbi faces.

Senator HELMS. Over the weekend the Attorney General was asked if there are any U.S. laws currently on the books which prevent economic relations with a nation occupied by Castro's Cuban forces. That question was in tandem with the Angola situation and had reference to Gulf/Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, Cities Service, and others who have been or are still active in Angola.

Do you know whether there are any laws that prevent economic relations with Angola in this regard?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, there clearly are all kinds of laws based on the Foreign Assistance Act, Senator, that would prohibit any kind of aid program.

Senator HELMS. I'm sorry. Would you repeat that, please.

Mr. CROCKER. Yes.

There are all kinds of laws in terms of the foreign assistance legislation that would prohibit aid programs. Of course, we do not have any aid programs under those kinds of headings in Angola. Our relationship on the economic side is essentially commercial.

Senator HELMS. Well, I guess that leads me to the obvious next question. Do you favor the enforcement of such laws if indeed the Attorney General and others find them to be applicable?

Of course I'm talking about the State Department when I say "you."

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I'm trying to make sure that I understand your question.

We do not believe that there is any law at present, from our analysis, that we are operating inconsistent with. The Eximbank, for example, has in the past had some transactions in Angola, some of which are still being dispersed. There have been no new decisions by the Eximbank for some considerable period of time, and that is because we want it that way.

So, we are retaining the ability to encourage or discourage such commercial transactions through our review process on Eximbank activity in Angola, as anyplace else, and that we continue.

We have also made it clear if some public statements, Senator, that we are urging our companies to think about where all this is headed and about the strategic interests as well as the commercial interests that they have.

That is far as our decisions have gone at this point. That is what the State Department position is.

Senator HELMS. Does the State Department favor tightening the screws on these companies who are dealing with the Communist government to the detriment of the foreign policy of this country? It's hard to understand the foreign policy of this country most of the time, but I think I understand this.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, as someone who is paid to try to communicate it, Senator, let me have a try.

The State Department and the administration have been reviewing this question for some months. We have reached the conclusion that we have the right policies in place for now.

We have also reached the conclusion that it is under review, and we'll see how things develop, how the signals are received.

Senator HELMS. So, you're saying you don't know whether the State Department and the administration want to tighten the screws on these companies? That's a yes-or-no question.

Mr. CROCKER. We have not made any further decisions, beyond what I mentioned just a moment ago, concerning Exim lending, for example, which is basically on hold.

Senator HELMS. I am told that prior to my arrival you stated that Dr. Savimbi does not want an outright military victory. Is that correct? Is that what you said?

Mr. CROCKER. What he stressed with us in our contacts with him over the years—and we have had a great many of them—has been that he is hoping for a chance for Angolans to reconcile, for the different major movements and groups in Angola to sit down and work out a system that is basically representative of Angola's complexity, that he recognizes that were he even to get to Luanda at the head of a tank column, the MPLA would switch places with him and that that would not bring peace either. So, he is talking, I think, about reconciliation.

Senator HELMS. Does that mean that either he, or you, or a combination of the two—and again, by "you," Chester, I mean the State Department—do you think he is incapable of victory?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, as we look at the military realities in that very large country, and it is a huge country with a population of about 8 million people, we think the prospects of an outright victory by either side are remote. We have found Dr. Savimbi to be a very realistic analyst of that situation himself.

I would describe the chances for an outright win by either side as remote.

Senator HELMS. What is the United States proposal to the MPLA regime in Angola with reference to Cuban troop withdrawal?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we have been seeking to narrow the gaps which have been very substantial between South Africa and the MPLA government on the timing and sequencing of Cuban withdrawal on the one hand in relation to the Namibia Resolution 435 plan on the other hand.

What we are seeking and what we have proposed is a compromise between the two positions that would include the removal of all Cuban combat forces from Angola—all. The precise timing has not obviously been agreed, and that is where the negotiation is centered right now.

But we have made it abundantly clear that we do not intend to have our proposal used in any way as a means for the MPLA to destroy Savimbi or to leave him out. We have also made it clear that there is going to have to be give and take on both sides, and that we mean all Cuban combat troops, not some of them, or something like that.

Senator HELMS. So some of the reports reaching me and maybe some other Senators are incorrect—that your proposal—again, meaning the administration's or the State Department's—would allow 10,000 Cuban troops to remain? You are saying all of them?

Mr. CROCKER. That's correct, Senator. That's correct.

Senator HELMS. None, zero, zilch.

Mr. CROCKER. It is not accurate to say that we, the administration, are proposing that *x* thousand of them can remain.

There is an Angolan published proposal and there are various South African published proposals which do call for different groups, different numbers and timing.

In November 1984, the MPLA published a proposal which included a residual of 10,000 to remain indefinitely. We have made it very clear that that is not going to sell.

Senator HELMS. You have made very clear what, sir?

Mr. CROCKER. That that's not going to sell.

Senator HELMS. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, although Senator Helms and I seldom ever arrive at the same spot, we have the same inclination to seek some clarity here. I think Senator Helms' questions put sharply into focus part of at least this Senator's confusion.

Let me ask some basic questions and it is difficult, I know, but if you could not use up my 10 minutes so that I could get in four questions, I would appreciate it.

The first question that I would like to ask you is one that I think we seldom ask outright although it is implicit in all our policy decisions, and it is this. Would you tell us, in as brief time as you can, what interest of the United States we would be protecting by giving aid to Mr. Savimbi? What American interest would we be protecting in giving aid, covert or overt, to Savimbi?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I think the first interest is that we wish to make it clear, and I think many Americans feel this way, that those who are resisting Soviet adventurism and a Soviet effort to solve internal conflicts militarily are not going to be alone, that they are going to have support from this country. I think that is a very important message and it is one that goes well beyond southern Africa.

Second, I think what we are doing, frankly, is reenergizing, through this process, our own negotiations. We are making it clear that there is no military solution and that we are going to help make that prediction come true, because we are going to right, in a sense——

Senator BIDEN. No; I am not talking about method. You have defined an interest. The first interest is that we are going to help freedom fighters wherever they are against Soviet adventurism, if there is Soviet adventurism.

But what U.S. interest is there? Is there a strategic interest? Is there an economic interest? You have defined a political interest, it seems to me. Is there a strategic or economic interest that you can define for us that would be aided in helping Savimbi, U.S. interest?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, indeed so, Senator. The point I was making under the second category is that we are trying to bolster our negotiation, our diplomacy. If it succeeds, many U.S. interests are advanced. We see the removal of South Africans from Namibia, where they have no business being; we see the removal of Cubans from Angola, where they have no business being; we see a region that would be less militarized; we see a chance for Angola to return to peace, for America to pursue, without constraint, its full economic interests there, and so forth.

It also speaks to a strategic point of a broader sort, Senator, if I may just make one more point.

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. CROCKER. The Soviet Union, in the mid-1970's, tried to exploit a moment of our own indecision and weakness, not only in Angola but in other parts of the world. That history is behind us now, and it is time to rectify those situations in appropriate ways. That is what we are trying to do.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I would argue with you at another time, when we had more time, that our attempt to intervene promoted Soviet activity, but that is another question for another date.

Now, you have defined squarely at least two interests and I am sure there are others, if you had time, from the perspective of the administration, if I were willing to give you more of my 10 minutes, that you could mention. But one is clearly South Africa. South Africa has no business being in Namibia, as you point out. South Africa was in Namibia, in terms of their influence and impact, long before the Russians or Cubans were in Angola.

Now, it seems to me that they have us in a catch-22 position, and I wonder if you would respond to this.

Obviously they know, the South Africans, that as long as the Cubans and Russians are in any way, shape, or form involved with the MPLA in Luanda, we will not put inordinate pressure on them to get out of helping Savimbi and/or out of Namibia. That's clear to everybody who looks at it.

You don't doubt that for a minute, do you? I mean, they understand our policy. The South Africans in Pretoria, they sit there and they say "Aha, look, we know the Americans are not going anywhere as long as the Cubans are there."

Now, what do they further think: "Well, OK, we have an option. We can boot them out, which can precipitate movement of the Cubans, but if they don't go, we have to replace them. Somebody has to help Savimbi if you are to meet your objective from your perspective."

So, it seems to me that the South Africans have you in a catch-22 position, have the administration buying on to this following notion: that, (*a*), the best way for us to keep pressure off Pretoria—"us" meaning Pretoria—the best way to keep pressure off us with regard to Namibia is to keep the civil war going in Angola because the United States only has one or two options in light of what their stated objective is. They either continue to let us participate and help Savimbi and do it from Namibia as well as from South Africa; or they say you guys get out, we are really bringing the hammer down on you and, by the way, we are sending American troops to do what you used to do, and they are not going to do that.

So, I don't know what you do. I don't know where you go.

It seems to me the South Africans "got 'cha." And I'm not being facetious, either. I am being serious.

Give me an explanation of why the South Africans would move at all to bring a resolution to the situation in Angola, because the moment there is a resolution, then they know they are out of Namibia—unless you believe the only reason they are in Namibia is because of Angola.

Maybe that is the question you should answer first. Do you believe that? Do you believe the only reason the South Africans remain in Namibia is because of the situation in Angola?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, Senator, you have asked several questions, there.

On the last one, obviously it is more complex than that. They were placed in Namibia by the Western allies in World War I.

Senator BIDEN. Right. I understand that.

Mr. CROCKER. And so, the explanation of why they are there goes back a long way.

Clearly, in recent years, in the last 10 years or so, the Cuban intervention there has complicated their decision because as they look at leaving Windhoek, leaving Namibia, they look at a vacuum there that could be easily influenced from across that northern border. That is in their thinking.

But I am not sure I can accept the notion of a catch 22 because that would assume the South Africans want to stay put exactly where they are forever, and that it is in their interest to stay involved in a cross-border conflict that costs a significant amount of dollars, involved in a very messy situation in Namibia itself, which is without joy for them, unresolved, with a lack of confidence, with investors leaving, with whites leaving. It is a messy situation.

If we can define this package, which has proven complicated, but is worth pursuing, we believe the South Africans will see it as in their interest to get out.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you this. The Dole resolution says that the objective is for free and fair elections to be held in Angola. That is the objective of the resolution. I think that is the language, "free and fair elections."

Do you all support that?

Mr. CROCKER. I'm not sure I've seen the latest version, but we have worked with the Congress in trying to shape some form of expression of congressional support.

Senator BIDEN. So the answer is you are not sure whether you support the Dole resolution?

Mr. CROCKER. No; I think we do support it, Senator. I am just not certain if you are giving me a direct quote from something or not because I have not got it in front of me.

Senator BIDEN. Would you all support a resolution that, say, I would introduce calling for free and fair elections in South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. We've been supporting it all along. We think that is a great idea.

Senator BIDEN. You do?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes.

Senator Biden: With the same conditions and everything, that we would support folks, people who are fighting for their freedom in South Africa for the right to vote? You would do the same thing?

If I just went through here and just changed the words—I will come back to this. I will draft it for you and will just change the name. Seriously. I will replace freedom fighters and talk about black South Africa. Every place we talk about MPLA having to move, we'll talk about Pretoria having to move. After all, it is not fair for you to answer it in the abstract because I have not drafted it yet. But I have the feeling that you won't like it.

Mr. CROCKER. I think we have done a great deal in our policies to try to advance the goal of freedom in South Africa, Senator, in this country and by the administration.

Senator BIDEN. I'm not suggesting otherwise and that was not the question. The question was whether or not you would go as far as you are willing to go in Angola for free and fair elections.

Mr. CROCKER. I'm not aware that South Africa, Senator, has been intervened in by a foreign army which has poured $2 billion worth

of hardware in that country in the last 10 years to try to extirpate the concept of freedom at gunpoint. That is what we are talking about in the Angolan case.

Senator BIDEN. Some would suggest that the present Afrikaner Government, although indigenous, is, in fact, one that has poured billions of dollars into insuring that tens of thousands, indeed millions, of blacks have no freedom at all. Some would suggest that—like me. And I am not sure, to that black person, whether it makes a whole lot of difference whether or not it is a Russian-funded Cuban doing it to them or whether it is that "enlightened" Afrikaner leadership doing it to them.

I'm not sure it makes a lot of difference. But, then again, we can talk about that some more later.

I see that my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator TRIBLE.

Senator TRIBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that, notwithstanding your very best efforts, to date our diplomatic strategy has been substantially unproductive. If, after all this time, that policy has proved ineffectual, it seems to me it is time to try a new approach. Repeal of the Clark amendment permits us to raise the cost to the Cuban-Soviet presence in Angola, and I think we should do so by providing assistance to units or forces who are waging a rather historic and heroic struggle against the central government, the Marxist Angolan Government.

Moreover, just to put all of this in context and show there are balanced and different views on this committee, I think there is a larger purpose to be served by assisting the forces of Savimbi. It is a moral purpose.

How can we, in good conscience, deny support to those who resist tyranny? I don't think we can, and I believe that ultimately the majority of our colleagues here will reach that same conclusion.

I would propose this really not as a substitute to diplomacy but rather as a complementary approach. I believe that the use of pressure will advance the diplomatic timetable and will permit the forces seeking a peaceful resolution a far greater chance of success.

I have to comment on a statement of Senator Pell. He suggested the oddity of Gulf/Chevron's presence in Angola. The oddity it seems to me is not that we support Savimbi and that Gulf/Chevron is at risk, but rather that our Nation supports Savimbi and that an American corporation is doing business with a Marxist government and providing that Marxist government with the dollars to fuel the occupation, or rather presence, of the Cuban and Soviet advisers and military personnel.

That seems to me to be the oddity, although I am sure reasonable men would disagree on how they judge the situation.

It seems to me that an American corporation, doing business that places it at odds with the policy of its own government, does so at risk. I think it raises substantial moral questions, as well that ought to be addressed in this debate.

Let me ask you, if I might, to spell out more specifically for us the nature of the aid, the extent of the aid the Soviet bloc nations

are providing to the Luanda Government and the nature of the Soviet-Cuban and Eastern bloc presence?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, you made several points, and I can only agree with you heartily when you said that the kinds of things we are talking about can complement and maybe advance the diplomatic timetable.

On your first point, that our efforts have been without fruit, we would, of course, take issue with that. We believe we have defined a framework for peace in southern Africa, which has placed the Soviets on the defensive, and the name of the game is to find a way to make it work and make it come to the goal line. We are not there yet.

Senator TRIBLE. "Substantially unproductive" were my words, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. CROCKER. But, in any event, getting to your factual question on aid, our figures would show that in the military field, the MPLA government has received something on the order of $4 billion since 1976 in military equipment and technology. That comes largely from the Soviet Union itself, but not exclusively.

That is since 1976.

We also figure that in the last couple of years the relevant figure is about $2 billion. So half of it has been in the last couple of years.

In other areas, of course there are many different kinds of advisory people there from East bloc countries. We "guesstimate" 1,500 Soviet and bloc military advisors in Angola; 35,000 Cuban military personnel, of whom 27,000 to 28,000 are combat troops. Those are the figures that we are holding.

Senator TRIBLE. A rather substantial presence.

Mr. CROCKER. It is, indeed.

Senator TRIBLE. Let me ask you to evaluate the role that U.S. investment now plays in supporting the central government. I would be particularly interested in the dollars generated by the activities of Gulf/Chevron and how those dollars are being spent by the central government.

Mr. CROCKER. If I could, Senator, I would like to get that for the record for you, in terms of precise dollar amounts.

But it is clear that, (*a*) oil represents the great majority of Angola's exports; and it is clear, (*b*) that our companies are a major participant, the major participant, in the oil industry of Angola, but not the only one. There are other countries represented in a significant fashion in Angola's rapidly developing oil industry.

I think the point that we would stress is that a number of these companies have been there for a long time. They were there during the Portuguese period and they have tried to find a basis for coexistence with whoever is in charge. They have found that the Angola Government has lived up to its side of commercial agreements and so they find it a positive place to do business.

As to what net effect it has, this investment, it generates obviously significant amounts of hard currency, which can be used to help pay for the war effort, as well as for other kinds of imports. But, given the war effort that is very major, a large chunk of the export revenues are going to support that.

The other point I think I have to stress is that if our firms are not doing it, we sense that there is a very long line of eager bidders

from other countries who will fill the shoes of Americans, were they to leave under one circumstance or another.

I have just been passed a note from an expert who informs me that oil accounts for about 90 percent of the government's budget.

Senator TRIBLE. Ninety percent.

My understanding is that the government pays the Cubans cash for their presence. Is that not the case?

Mr. CROCKER. It is very hard for us to document precisely what those arrangements are, but we do believe that the Cuban Government receives hard currency for its personnel there, and in various other forms gets a subsidy for its transport costs and so on, probably from the Soviet Union.

Senator TRIBLE. Does Gulf/Chevron also pay off UNITA forces to protect their holdings?

Mr. CROCKER. Not to my knowledge, Senator.

Senator TRIBLE. Although you have heard allegations?

Mr. CROCKER. I have heard allegations, but I do not have any evidence on it.

Senator TRIBLE. How would you describe the political program for the UNITA forces? We have heard from Mr. Savimbi that his intention is not to earn an armed victory, but rather to force a political resolution, a power-sharing arrangement.

What do you view as the political program of UNITA? What would their presence in government mean to that country in terms of elections, basic freedoms, respect for different tribal groups, those kinds of things?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, the UNITA program which you referred to includes a number of basic things, including getting foreign forces out of the country, including the need for some form of coalition to be built between the major movements, representing the major ethnic groups of the country. There is no doubt that ethnic factors are a key element here, but not the only one in the UNITA program; that is to say, the people amongst whom UNITA is based are not adequately represented in the central government. That is a factor.

UNITA does speak of elections at some stage and an ultimate reconciliation, and so that is an element in their program.

There is, I think, a desire to broaden Angola's international relationships, and that is an element in their program, away from the East and toward something more closely approaching genuine nonalignment.

Senator TRIBLE. How many parties are there in Angola today countenanced by the central government?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, the central government countenances one party.

Senator TRIBLE. Is there freedom of speech?

Mr. CROCKER. I think I would find it hard to describe it that way, Senator.

Senator TRIBLE. Is there freedom of press?

Mr. CROCKER. There is a government-controlled press.

Senator TRIBLE. Is there freedom of assembly?

Mr. CROCKER. In government-controlled areas, I think, only with government permission.

Senator TRIBLE. I am focusing these questions on the central government.

Does the central government grant any of the basic rights and freedoms that are part of the American experience?

Mr. CROCKER. It's a one-party Marxist state, Senator. I think that really answers the question.

Senator TRIBLE. Is the answer yes or no?

Mr. CROCKER. No.

Senator TRIBLE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Trible.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, when did the MPLA launch its offensive last year against UNITA?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, the beginnings of it could be seen as early as July and early August of this past summer, when we really began to notice it through our own means. That does not mean there were not decisions taken considerably earlier to move people around.

It got into high gear in late August and September, and throughout September and halfway into October was the height of the offensive.

Senator SARBANES. When did the South African Government establish an interim government in Namibia?

Mr. CROCKER. The initial announcements were made in April 1985, and there were further announcements confirming some of these decisions I believe in June 1985. I might want to correct that for the record, but that is what my memory tells me.

Senator SARBANES. We regarded that as a very negative development, did we not, a move from the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435 and a blow to our Namibia policy?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we regarded it as a set of developments that we could not in any way associate with and we rejected them as without any consequence internationally. This is an experience which we have had before, going back to 1978, with efforts then to establish an internal structure in Windhoek, which we rejected then and we reject now.

Senator SARBANES. You had the Angolans for the first time drawn into a framework which associated the departure of Cuban troops with the independence of Namibia, is that correct, although their proposal was not fully satisfactory?

Is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes; with the Angolan decision in the fall of 1984 to put forward a proposal that clearly accepted the basic premise that we were working on. That was an important step forward.

Senator SARBANES. And then, was it in March 1985 that you presented back a proposal to them?

Mr. CROCKER. After further contacts with both sides, we put back a compromise proposal in March of 1985, yes.

Senator SARBANES. And then, within a month or two, the South Africans moved in completely the opposite direction on Namibia, did they not?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, they made the decisions you referred to. We did not find them helpful at the time, and we said so.

Senator SARBANES. What do you think the perception was in Luanda of that development? It undercut, did it not, the process you were seeking to put into place?

Mr. CROCKER. As we told the Angolan leadership at the time these events happened, it could only undercut our approach if other parties gave credence to these internal institutions which were being created in Windhoek, and we were not going to, and our Western allies were not going to, and the front line states were not going to.

So we told the Angolans that that was our position and therefore we stick with our approach.

Senator SARBANES. Well, that ameliorated it, but it did send a certain signal to them about South African intentions, or it reasonably might have done so, might it not have?

Mr. CROCKER. I think there is no question, and I take your point.

Let me just add to it that there is a very poor level of confidence and trust between these two parties. There has been some degree of cooperation on the ground in Southern Angola, after the disengagement agreement that we negotiated, but only at the working military level. At the political level, there is very limited trust and confidence between those two governments. And this clearly fueled it.

Senator SARBANES. Let me just carry this forward.

You had a South African action, which in effect, to undercut what you were seeking to put into place, with the United States trying to act as a neutral or mediating party in the area. Then when was the Clark amendment repealed?

Mr. CROCKER. It would have been the month of July, I believe, of this past summer, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. What signal did that send?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I cannot speak for the Angolan Government in that regard. You know, there are many things that took place and you did not mention one, if I could just add it, which was the raid on Cabinda, in which South Africans were clearly involved, which also could have raised the same questions of confidence and trust on the Angolan side.

There are a great many things here which could be looked at as potential excuses, if you will.

On the other hand, if you are more inclined to believe them, they could be looked at as valid reasons for not proceeding.

Whatever the case may be, they did not test us, they did not take advantage of our role as a mediator to test us. They gave us no reply for month after month after month to our March proposals, such that we were unable to call the South Africans on a number of things. So we had a hiatus here, and then we saw the offensive.

Senator SARBANES. When did the Cabinda attack occur?

Mr. CROCKER. I believe it was May 1985.

Senator SARBANES. So, you presented this proposal in March, saying you thought should be tested, and a month later the South Africans establish the interim government in Namibia, which you criticized sharply at the time, and then a month later they carry out the Cabinda attack, and a month or two after that we repeal the Clark amendment.

If you are trying to work at a diplomatic resolution, it does not seem to me that this was a very helpful sequence of events.

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I wish that the history of all this could be covered from just those events. But I would stress that the offensive we are talking about, the roots of that offensive, can be traced back to decisions taken in 1983 and 1984 by Luanda, Moscow, and Havana, to raise the military ante.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think there was a difference in the Soviet view of what they wanted to see done in Angola and the view of the Angolan Government for a period of time?

Mr. CROCKER. We have seen at periods of time differences of emphasis and even clear divergencies about which way to go at some points in the process.

Senator SARBANES. If the Soviets wanted the government to take a harder line and it was resisting Soviet pressure, would not the sequence of events that I have just outlined perhaps serve the purpose of moving the government toward the Soviet position, help to do so?

Mr. CROCKER. I think we are getting in, here, to a question of what is the degree of consensus and strength on the part of the Angolan Government itself, how much autonomy do they have to make the kinds of decisions that we are talking about, how much unity is there in their own ranks. During much of the period we are talking about, it was very unclear to us. We were making it as clear as we could to them that if they would give us something to work with, it would much enhance our influence vis-a-vis the South Africans. If they give us nothing, it leads down to a track of escalation on both sides that is going to be without joy for them ultimately.

Senator SARBANES. But they gave you something in the fall of 1984, not enough, but something of consequence. Did you not regard that proposal as being of consequence?

Mr. CROCKER. We regarded it as, and we told them at the time that it was, of consequence. We also, during all the period you are referring to, told the South Africans that we looked to them as well to make a major step forward in terms of our March proposals, and for months they did not.

Senator SARBANES. I have two other areas that I want to cover before my time runs out.

Did the Cuban troops participate in the MPLA offensive that began, I think you said roughly in August of last year?

Mr. CROCKER. It's our best estimate that they participated in advisory roles, in logistical roles, in air defense to some degree, as pilots, in more specialized role, not in terms of main force infantry so much.

Senator SARBANES. If the Cubans were to participate fully in terms of main force infantry, would that represent a significant alteration in the balance of forces in the area?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, it would be a new threshold, yes. We have not seen much of that in recent years, where there have been major sweeps and search and destroy and that kind of activity by the Cuban infantry units.

Senator SARBANES. What comparable force could be placed in opposition to them?

Mr. CROCKER. I'm not aware of any beyond those that are already engaged. Of course, UNITA has faced Cubans and has gone after Cubans, has taken the offensive against Cubans, particularly in garrison modes, where they have been protecting large bases and cities, that kind of thing. Intermittently, on occasion, during strikes, the South Africans have gone after the Cubans, but only very intermittently.

Senator SARBANES. So, if the Cuban forces were committed in a major way in the fighting, I take it that the only comparable force that could be moved on the other side would be South African troops, would that be correct?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes; but I don't think I would want to draw the conclusion from the question, though, that the South Africans are eager to do that. But that is the only obvious one that jumps to mind. That's right, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Let me ask you this.

Has our Government encouraged the oil companies to carry on their activities in Angola—our Government?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, we are dealing with a dynamic situation. We have made decisions——

Senator SARBANES. In the past.

Mr. CROCKER [continuing]. We have made decisions in the past in terms of Exim lending, which is the principal way that our view is reflected, to help with the financing and the guarantees for a package that involved a number of private sector banks, too, for Gulf/Chevron and other companies. The last such decision was in the summer of 1984.

Senator SARBANES. That was not only government tolerance, but a positive government decision to encourage this economic activity, is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. To support our own companies, that's right. We do not look at it as aid to Angola. We looked at it at the time as support for the commercial activity of our companies.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think, to put a hypothetical to you, that United States interests would be better served if the American companies were to leave and Angolan oil were to be developed by Soviet and East European technical personnel?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, the more likely example would be that other Western companies might come into their place. In any event, the oil sales would generate the same kinds of hard currencies, one assumes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, taking it a step further, suppose, in fact, that the Soviets or the Eastern Europeans came in and assumed control of that oil production. To what extent would that enhance the Soviet ability to control Angola?

Or, to put the question differently, to what extent would it obviously minimize any possibility that Angola might be able to move in a direction that would separate it from the Soviet Union?

Mr. CROCKER. I think I would be hard pressed to answer that there would be any material impact on that. I would like to believe, as I am sure you would, that the presence of our firms in the oil sector and other sectors of Angola constitutes an influence for peace and a pressure on the MPLA government to get with the program and to make the big decisions.

I'd like to be able to make that argument. It is very, very hard to sustain. And that is one of the things we are trying to signal by what we have said, Senator, that we urge our companies to be aware of the fact that there is a dynamic situation, that the escalation has occurred, and we hope they are thinking about the future there.

Senator SARBANES. I see my time is up.

I have one final question because the question was asked earlier which implied that Soviet-Cuban support of the MPLA was financially related, because they are paid in hard currency. That is a reasonable point to make, but I would like to pursue it for a moment.

Do you think that their involvement would be markedly affected by a change in the economics of it, or do you think it is an involvement based on other reasons and that they would seek to sustain it in any event, even if the financial costs to them, the terms of the financial costs, were to be shifted in a negative direction?

Mr. CROCKER. It's only an impression, Senator, but I think I lean toward the latter part of your question; that is to say, while it would make a difference to them in terms of it costing them more to sustain this if there were not hard currency available to pay it, I don't think that would be the decisive factor in Soviet-Cuban decisionmaking, Soviet decisionmaking particularly. They have perhaps a broader view of what is at stake, and they might well take decisions, even if it costs them.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

I want to recognize Senator Pressler and then Senator Dodd. But let me just mention that the Chair is going to ask that we move ahead shortly and engage our next witness in the discussion. I appreciate that Senators are already into the meetings of the two caucuses. There is also the possibility that there will be floor action this afternoon involving the committee; thus we really need to move toward a conclusion of this hearing in the event we have that situation.

I apologize for holding everybody, but I do think we need to move ahead.

I will call now upon Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall not use all of my time. But I do want to ask two questions that are not entirely clear in my mind.

One is exactly what does Savimbi stand for in the sense of would the Angolan people be better off under him? I know that he is against the Communists and against the Cubans. But there seems to be so much mystique about him, so much excitement. What is the State Department's view of what Savimbi really stands for and what kind of government would he have?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we obviously can look at the words and the statements that are issued by UNITA and its leadership and then we can try to look behind that at the real situation in Angola.

It is our assumption, based on our knowledge of him and the movement, that UNITA is a nationalist force, that it seeks to try to expand the area in which Angola can be independent, and there is

a great deal of feeling about the degree of dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans when you talk to UNITA people.

So, I think we should take seriously the argument that there is a desire for more nonalignment, for more balanced foreign relations, moving away from sole dependence, and orientation toward the East. I think we can take that as given.

There are many aspects of UNITA's internal organization that suggest a grassroots movement, with effective organization of people in civilian activities as well as military activities.

Senator PRESSLER. Would the people of Angola be better off under him? If so, in what ways?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I think that is a very speculative question. But, clearly, we believe that here is a man who wants to see a free and independent Angola and he wants to see foreign forces out. In that broad sense; yes. But I do not think that he has illusions.

What he is looking for is power sharing.

Senator PRESSLER. What would be the consequences of our not giving this additional aid? What would be the most immediate consequences?

Mr. CROCKER. I think you would see negative signals sent at this point, Senator.

Senator PRESSLER. Aside from signals, what would happen?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, that would have consequences. If people saw that, despite all the debate here and the fact that the Clark amendment had been repealed and so on, that on balance there was not going to be any help provided, any support provided, why others would draw conclusions from that, and it might, in fact, encourage the pursuit of the military option by those in power now, which would not be helpful.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My apologies to you and the Assistant Secretary for being late, but the aircraft getting in here this morning was a little bit backed up.

I have one question for you, Mr. Secretary.

The title of today's hearing is "Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy." Very candidly, haven't we already decided what we are going to do? Has not, in fact, the administration already made a decision to provide military assistance to Mr. Savimbi? Has not that decision already been reached?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we have made a number of decisions and the policy will remain under review as long as the situation is dynamic.

Senator DODD. Haven't they made the decision already to notify the Congress that they intend to go forward? We are not talking about options. We can talk about the merits of that decision. But the decision, in fact, has been made to provide military assistance to Mr. Savimbi.

Mr. CROCKER. Certain decisions have been made to provide both moral and material assistance, as has been said, and to do so in ways that are effective and appropriate.

Yes. The answer is yes.

Senator DODD. So, we are not talking about resolutions, such as the Dole resolution, that calls for providing moral support, or Senator Helms' proposition to provide $27 million in assistance. Already the administration is tapping into the reserve accounts to provide that assistance. Is that not the case?

Mr. CROCKER. I cannot comment beyond what I have said. Certain decisions have been made. There may be others to be made. But I think we also need to underscore the point in my opening comments that the policy is to get a negotiated solution.

Senator DODD. I understand that. I appreciate that. I am getting at what the purpose of this hearing today is, that, in fact, there will not be a request to come to the Congress to ask for appropriations. You will be using existing funds to provide that assistance to Mr. Savimbi?

Mr. CROCKER. On that point, I would also just confirm what you have said. We are not asking for mandated assistance, mandated by the legislature. That is correct.

Senator DODD. Have we already been drawing down on those funds?

Mr. CROCKER. The decisions have been made and the process is in motion.

I cannot go beyond that, Senator.

Senator DODD. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Are there further questions of Secretary Crocker?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. If not, we thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for coming, for your testimony, and for your answers to our questions.

The Chair would like to call now former Secretary Moose and Mr. Henriksen to the witness table.

Will both of you please be seated at the table.

I will call upon former Secretary Moose to testify first.

Secretary Moose, obviously your testimony and that of Mr. Henriksen will be made a part of the record. You may proceed as you would choose. If you would wish to summarize in a few minutes, that would be helpful simply because we are in a time situation where I think members would like to get into questions with you. But I welcome you and ask you to testify at this point.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD M. MOOSE, VICE PRESIDENT, SHEARON/LEHMAN BROS

Mr. MOOSE. I appreciate your welcome, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and I also appreciate your insertion of the full text of my prepared remarks into the record. I will do my best to summarize them very briefly.

The Angola debate is an odd and an asymmetrical one, odd in the sense that while the debate ostensibly concerns Africa, the overriding objective of those who have precipitated it appears to be to recast the conduct of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

The ideological basis of the Savimbi's popularity probably accounts for the asymmetry of the debate. One side argues the ideological issues to which it is attached, while the other invokes a set

of regional considerations and interests which it believes are threatened.

To one side, the argument is deceptively simple: if one opposes communism, then one should back Mr. Savimbi. The opposing argument is devoid of emotional appeal, is far more complex and involves any number of obscure, complicated realities.

I do not think the public really understands this debate. I think, in our peculiarly American manner, we have gone about making foreign policy on the basis of how we feel about a foreigner and about a country that few of us know very much about. I am pleased to be here to make whatever little contribution I can to trying to define these issues and to help in any way I can, the committee to unravel such complexities as the committee has done so well in the past.

The way the Angolan debate has evolved, one side says that we are fighting communism. The other side rejects this and says while it is all right to fight communism, if we fight on Mr. Savimbi's side, we are going to be working with South Africa and we must not do that.

I believe that it is possible for the United States to pursue a policy which combines in a rational policy framework these two objectives. The key element in such a framework is the recognition that South Africa is the primary source of the region's instability and that the Communists are the main beneficiaries of that instability. By acting to end Pretoria's interference with its neighbors, we can effectively undercut the Soviet Union and realize the full potential of our own influence.

The pursuit of such a policy is within our ability, but acting piecemeal on Mr. Savimbi's corner of Angola is not an intelligent way to proceed. If we wish to succeed, we must look at Angola in a regional context. If we ignore the regional realities and attempt to mix covert intervention with our current diplomatic efforts, we risk enmeshing ourselves in a situation which will be messy, costly, and from which extrication will be very difficult and success quite unlikely.

The objection to our working with South Africa or appearing to do so rests on practical as well as moral grounds. We must recognize that the South African Government, as presently constituted, represents an illegitimate, doomed, and decaying political order. As the Afrikaners flail blindly in an effort to secure their own survival, those around them are drawn into the vortex. The destabilization of Southern Africa is, in fact, the process that I am describing. It is not something brought about by the Communists. It is being brought about by the Afrikaners themselves. But, by virtue of the fact and the manner of their collapse, the South Africans are putting at risk much else, including our own policy.

The Reagan administration has frequently, continuously emphasized the importance of stability in Southern Africa. Unfortunately, it has chosen to make the South African Government the centerpiece of its efforts to insure that stability. The central importance of South Africa's role in Mr. Crocker's concept of regional stability is the primary justification for constructive engagement. In theory, good relations with Pretoria would enhance our influence. In the real world, the Afrikaners have followed their own most tragic in-

stincts. As their disintegration has progressed, our policy and our image have remained hostage to Pretoria's fate and folly.

In only one instance, that of Mozambique's security agreement with South Africa and its opening to Western financial and economic institutions, did the administration come close to deriving a positive result for constructive engagement. Unfortunately, that episode ended badly, but it contains relevant lessons for our options in Angola.

In the case of Mozambique the administration proved that patient, subtle policies can succeed. But it also turned out, unfortunately, that these policies were vulnerable to the peculiar imperatives of the South Africans and to the sometimes uncomprehending impulses of our own political system.

I would cite, by contrast, the manner in which we have dealt with Angola. Ten years ago, at the time of their independence, we intervened in Angola ourselves and encouraged the South Africans to do so as well. The South Africans have been in or about Angola ever since 1975. They have remained continuously involved in that Civil War, doing so in the name of defending Namibia against SWAPO. The South Africans sustained Savimbi's UNITA forces, they operate jointly with them, and they provide them air cover. The world has done nothing about this.

In response, the Angolan Government has sought assistance from the only source that has been willing to provide it, the Russians and the Cubans. This assistance has its large-scale beginning at the time of the South African invasion of Angola, in 1975, and has fluctuated with their activities ever since.

When the Reagan administration set its hand to Southern Africa, Pretoria was told that we would not press them to grant Namibia its independence until the Cubans had left Angola. Since the South Africans do not wish to leave Namibia, they have simply applied continuous pressure to insure that they are not asked to go.

Meanwhile, Pretoria's ongoing support of Savimbi has prevented the Luanda authorities from governing or from developing the country. Although Savimbi is an authentic regional leader, Luanda is unlikely to deal with him so long as South Africa is involved and he is allied with them. Whether the MPLA would talk with Savimbi or the UNITA leaders is not clear. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Savimbi will concede anything to Luanda as long as he believes that South Africa and/or the United States might back him in an effort to obtain a military victory.

It is suggested that we may be able to wean Mr. Savimbi away from Pretoria and the it would be all right for us to support him. Presumably, this strategy would entail our assuming responsibility for the total support of Mr. Savimbi's forces. Presumably, we would want his forces, not ours, to do the fighting. I believe the inescapable effect of this strategy would be to insure that the Cubans stay and to reinforce the perception that we are fighting South Africa's battles, and we would, indeed, be doing that.

By aligning ourselves with Mr. Savimbi, we would also be turning our back on the cause of Namibian independence. Since 1966, five American administrations, never have embraced the cause of Namibian independence. By joining Savimbi, who has supported

the South African campaign against SWAPO, we would, in effect, be taking up arms against Namibia's independence.

If we were to fight with Mr. Savimbi against Luanda and against SWAPO, on the grounds that they are Marxist led, we would be only a step away from supporting military action against the African National Congress [ANC]. I cannot believe that any American would welcome that prospect.

The progression of events that I have tried to outline is not an unrealistic one. What I am describing is what most of the rest of the world already perceives as happening. We will be lifting a burden from Pretoria's shoulders. More important would be the tremendous psychological lift which the Afrikaners would receive by virtue of finding ourselves allied with them.

Against this background, I believe that the point of departure for a sound Angola policy would be the elimination of South Africa as a factor in Angola's internal affairs. This would mean getting South African forces out of Angola immediately and putting an end to their support for Savimbi.

Forceful steps toward those ends would provide the necessary basis for our arranging with Luanda for the departure of the Cuban combat troops. Once having engaged ourselves in a legitimate and convincing manner on behalf of Angola's territorial integrity, the United States would be well positioned to deal seriously with the MPLA on the question of reconciliation with UNITA.

Until we can bring ourselves to recognize and confront the South African role, I think we have to reconcile ourselves to the continuation of the Cuban presence. Our tactics, as described this morning by Assistant Secretary Crocker, may be viable for a time; but at some point this romance with Mr. Savimbi will become so heated that Luanda can no longer overlook it. Indeed, the statements emanating from Washington these days cannot but further impair Luanda's confidence in us as honest brokers. Most importantly, U.S. strategy remains totally vulnerable to the type of South African sabotage which has immobilized it up to now.

The administration's strategy hangs by slender threads; but the formulas of Mr. Savimbi's American boosters are illogical and downright dangerous. These supporters of Mr. Savimbi, interestingly enough, are by no means in agreement with one another as to goals. Some would have the United States back UNITA in seeking a military victory; others, less ambitious, speak of bleeding the Soviets or making them pay. Yet others, with whom the State Department apparently agrees, would settle for improving Mr. Savimbi's bargaining positions.

These options involve strikingly different degrees of expectation, commitment, cost, and risk. The committee should examine these in some detail. The upper end of the risk scale could be very high, indeed.

Curiously enough, Mr. Savimbi, when he was in the United States, appears to have perceived more quickly than his local admirers the fact that Americans do not want to get close to South Africa and they probably do not want to fight a war in Angola. For these reasons, then, Mr. Savimbi publicly played down his military objectives and emphasized the goal of entering into talks with the MPLA authorities in Luanda.

The State Department, it seems to me, is trapped between good sense and the right wing; it is talking tougher while trying to protect the promising diplomatic initiatives, which it has underway.

The executive branch showed its support for Mr. Savimbi by letting him chat with the President. Now the Congress can pass a resolution to tell Mr. Savimbi that it, too, cares and to ask the President to help him. Presumably, the resolution will provide the justification for a program of covert assistance which can be turned on and off or denied at will.

Meanwhile, the State Department will pursue its talks with the Angolans and the South Africans concerning Namibia, a Cuban withdrawal timetable, and a political reconciliation. If Luanda is recalcitrant, we can apply military pressure through UNITA.

My concern and my fear is that it will prove that we will see that neither a lot of intervention nor just a little bit of intervention makes sense. I am afraid that either way, the Russians are more apt to be pleased than frightened.

I hope these hearings will go a considerable way toward establishing, and I believe they have already this morning, that there are issues here more complex than sending arms to aid Jonas Savimbi in fighting the Communists.

It is good that the committee is bringing the question into the open for, as I understand it, nothing that is contemplated will, in reality, be covert. This being the case, there really is no reason not to examine the matter in detail. Appealing "whereas" clauses often conceal gaps of fact and lapses of logic. Some of the most unfortunate policy of the last two decades has been made in secret and confirmed by resolution, as the records of this committee have so clearly established.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Moose.

Mr. HENRIKSEN.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD, CA

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Thank you very much.

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee.

Because of the time restraints, I will commit most of my testimony to the written record. At this time, I will turn immediately to my reasons for military and economic assistance to UNITA.

In my opinion, the United States, wherever possible, must provide emoral and material support to peoples struggling against Communist-aided governments. Otherwise, in the case of Angola, we as a Nation accept a Soviet dominated and a Communist state eventually analogous to that which is present in Eastern Europe.

For another reason, UNITA has long formed and will continue to form an important factor in Angolan politics. UNITA deserves to be strengthened on account of its hostility to the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, both open and avowed opponents of the United States.

For another reason, the continued viability of UNITA is the best guarantee that the MPLA will not have the resources to make mischief in the states bordering Angola. As the historical record shows, Communist states, especially when exempt from foreign

pressure, have tended to export revolution to neighboring countries or even around the world. Should the MPLA triumph over UNITA, we can expect Communist-backed insurgencies elsewhere in Africa to enjoy the MPLA support.

Angola already provides bases to SWAPO to strike into Namibia.

For another reason, for support for UNITA, the downfall of the MPLA will provided the greatest single factor toward the promotion of independence in Namibia from South African control. South Africa will not willingly allow a Marxist Namibian government to establish itself, lest such a government in turn support Communists insurgencies within South Africa proper. The removal of a powerfully backed Soviet client in Angola will remove South African justification for continued occupation of Namibia. Likewise, the reduction of tensions which would follow the collapse of the MPLA lessens Pretoria's well-founded concerns of Communist-backed raids and sabotage on its soil which are staged by the ANC.

It is an established fact that the ANC is closely allied with the South African Communist Party. The removal of such concerns also would help to remove South African's concerns and justifications against granting more freedoms to its own black population.

For still another reason, much is often made of the allegations that American aid to UNITA aligns the United States with the racist South Africa, which also provides much support to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. In my opinion, this is a nonissue.

First, Savimbi has made it clear on several occasions that necessity, not South African racial policies, requires him to accept South African aid.

Second, other states, in addition to South Africa, provide UNITA with assistance—African states, Middle Eastern states, and so on.

Third, if anything, American support lessens UNITA's dependence on South Africa.

During times of global struggle, the United States should not abstain from supporting a movement opposed to communism, just because that movement receives support from a country whose domestic policies offend our democratic values. When in its infancy, the United States accepted aid from the monarchy in France, while it fought against the colonial rule of King George III.

For another example, during World War II, we were allied with Stalinist Russia against Nazi Germany.

Finally, the United States is not aligning itself with South Africa by providing an anti-Communist movement with support any more than it is aligning itself with radical Islam by providing support to Afghan freedom fighters who oppose a Soviet occupation of their country.

For another reason, some critics of aid to UNITA may argue that American aid to Savimbi's group is a wasted effort since UNITA has no chance of winning. In my opinion, there is no weaker argument for opposition to assistance from the United States than this.

By extension, should we have denied aid to Britain during the Second World War because Hitler's forces appeared triumphant? No.

UNITA, in fact, has proved more viable than it seemed 10 years ago. It may ultimately force the collapse of the present-day MPLA

leadership or a place within an Angolan coalition government which is UNITA's goal.

Most importantly, the United States must not withhold aid from people who have their lives on the line against communism. To do so, we would not be a great power nor would we be deserving of a worthy judgment of history.

For still another reason, some critics of the U.S. aid to UNITA argue that the United States should not support Savimbi because he is a socialist, critical of private enterprise. U.S. foreign policy should not, however, enter into an uncritical crusade in favor of Adam Smith's views or some form of libertarian economics. In the past, the United States, for instance, has given aid to Marshall Tito, not because the United States necessarily agreed with Tito's economic policies, but because Tito defended his country's independence from Moscow.

For another example, relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China have approved in a gratifying fashion, despite the great difference in economic systems.

UNITA's commitment to a mixed economy, with a strong socialist component, should not, therefore, on its own disqualify UNITA from receiving U.S. aid.

The United States, in my opinion, should provide both military and economic aid to UNITA as soon as possible.

Thank you for this opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Henriksen.

Once again, the Chair would ask that we limit questions to a 10-minute period. I will now call upon the distinguished chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Henriksen, I would like to ask you first if you believe that there can be reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA? Would you favor an effort to move toward a negotiated settlement?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It will be difficult because of the tremendous animosities built up over a number of years, because of the ethnic factors involved. But it is not impossible.

There is a possibility. UNITA, as you know, represents a great number of Angolan people, and there is no reason that some form of canton government or some form of regional autonomy embodied within a unified Angola is possible.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you see assistance to Savimbi at this point as leverage to facilitate a negotiated settlement?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Yes, I do.

Senator KASSEBAUM. If, indeed, conditions are such that the MPLA would not be pressured toward negotiating, I can see us eventually, if we have no clear direction in our policy, moving the ante up at each step along the way, in which we have started down a road where it will be very difficult for us to change course, and gradually our involvement will become greater and greater.

I think we are at a very dangerous crossroads at this point in trying to ascertain what really would be of the greatest assistance to Mr. Savimbi and our own interests in the region in the long term. Rather than just dealing with the short term, proclaiming that we are indeed devoutly fighting the Communists. That is one aspect. But in the history of Angola and UNITA, and the MPLA, it

was not really the Communist issue that separated the two parties. Wouldn't you agree?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. There is a lot to agree to. Let me take it step by step.

I do think that by not helping UNITA, we risk the fact of what is the alternative. If South Africa, or if UNITA triumphs, rather, or if the MPLA triumphs over UNITA, then we are faced with another party, another Communist party in Africa which, in fact, will export revolution, which will do so in its neighboring territories.

I realize there is a slippery slope and everyone can be reminded of that because of Vietnam. But it is not the same thing. Just as we are providing support to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, everyone well knows that if they lose, the United States is not going to intervene militarily with soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan.

So, I think there is a clear understanding in my mind that there are some things we can do and some things that we cannot do.

No one is talking about military troops. Savimbi has not asked for them. I don't think it would be wise to send them in any case. And he is not asking for them.

So, I think there is a clear difference, I suppose, between the Vietnam situation and the policy I am espousing here.

Senator KASSEBAUM. When I said "don't you agree," I did not mean the whole scope of the statement. I meant regarding the history of UNITA and the MPLA in Angola. When the Portuguese left, Mr. Savimbi looked to the Chinese for support in his efforts to gain ruling authority there and in the contest with the MPLA, who had turned to the Soviets.

So, it has been a long, ongoing struggle for who was going to control the country.

I respect the ability of Mr. Savimbi to hold on as long as he has. He is an exceptionally capable and clever strategist. But I wondered if basically you felt a negotiated settlement was possible?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Yes, I do believe a negotiated settlement is possible.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Moose, you mentioned that you thought the key was really South Africa and South Africa's withdrawal.

You heard Dr. Crocker speak about the Lusaka accord. We did see for a period of time some action on the part of the government in Luanda to attempt to strive for a diplomatic solution, agreeing to withdrawal of Cuban troops, and then they backed away—for all sorts of reasons. The South Africans appeared to draw away from their suport of their agreement as well.

I wonder if you believe that it is realistic to assume that such an effort will be successful now, that South Africa will withdraw, and that the Cuban troops will withdraw.

Is it realistic to assume that all those chips will fall into place?

Mr. MOOSE. Well, I do believe that Cuban withdrawal is a possibility. I believe there is a greater possibility of the issue being resolved by negotiation than there is of its being resolved militarily.

I think that the basic problem is this. If there is to be a successful negotiation, it will be one probably brokered by the United States. I have said in my prepared testimony that I am afraid that our policy, is hostage to actions by the South African Government.

Senator Sarbanes earlier on in his line of questioning established a probable line of cause and effect indicative how South African actions in a critical period last year undermined the likelihood of Luanda's moving on the Cuban question.

You have to understand how little credibility the administration has with the Angolans. Nevertheless, they have gone along with this negotiating process. They went along with the idea of a cease fire. They were disappointed in that and in a number of other things that have occurred.

The Angolans are terribly suspicious of the United States for historical reasons. We never supported the independence struggle and we intervened once before. They hear things coming out of Washington, and they don't know what to believe. Then they also see our far greater solicitude about the feelings of the South Africans than about the very fundamental question of Angolan territorial integrity, or the right of Namibia to be free.

So our "bona fides" as negotiators or brokers are in some jeopardy. This is one of the reasons why the program of covert assistance concerns me and why I think it jeopardizes the negotiating process. I think, yes, there is a chance of a negotiated solution. I don't know whether it can be realized, but I do think it will be rendered much more complicated, if not impossible, by a program of assistance to Mr. Savimbi.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Henriksen, in your statement, you talk about the downfall of the MPLA.

I wondered what range of military and nonmilitary assistance you think the United States would have to provide to Savimbi to bring that about.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. What I said was that there is a possibility of a collapse of the present-day leadership of the MPLA. By that I mean within the MPLA a different faction would surface that would negotiate with UNITA, or would be more willing to entertain different policies from the present leadership. It has happened, though it is rare, that Communist leaderships collapse. But there is some precedent.

I have no idea, but I think there is a tremendous strain on the MPLA government. I don't think I could put a dollar amount on it. It is just impossible to do that.

Senator SARBANES. Well, you do suggest a dollar amount here. But I take it that dollar amount does not begin to reach the figures you think would be necessary to bring about the removal of the MPLA.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I put a recommendation for American aid. I am not sure that that would do it. I don't know.

I do know that American efforts to support UNITA will have more influence on the MPLA than not supporting UNITA. I have no doubt in my mind that the MPLA does not care whether we are honest brokers or dishonest brokers. What it cares about is maintaining its power.

Senator SARBANES. Is the $60 million figure you suggest the figure that you think is necessary to bring down the MPLA government in Angola?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. No; it could well be, but it is also a signal that America is serious.

Senator SARBANES. What is the figure for American aid that you think is necessary to bring down the MPLA?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. As I said, I don't think it is going to be determined on American aid at all. It will depend on the will of the Angolan people, on both sides. American aid is simply our endorsement of a policy toward negotiation and in favor of UNITA.

Senator SARBANES. Well, what is your scenario of what is going to happen?

Suppose the $60 million is provided, then what?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It could, in all likelihood, convince those in the MPLA government that they are going to have to reckon with Mr. Savimbi in one form or another, that a negotiated settlement, some sort, as I say, of perhaps regional autonomy, perhaps some sort of coalition government is a best way, a negotiated settlement, that a war will be indefinitely prolonged, that it will not lead to the eradication of Mr. Savimbi from their point of view.

Senator SARBANES. If the Cubans enter into this in an active combatuate mode. What is your scenario for dealing with developments of the Cuban enter into this is an active combat role.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Do you mean if the Cubans intervene more than they have already in the MPLA?

Senator SARBANES. Do you accept the statement made earlier by Secretary Crocker, that the Cubans have not been actively involved in combat?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. No.

I don't think there is any way to really verify it 100 percent. But it is my opinion that the Cubans have, in some cases, intervened directly, and they have had combat directly with South African forces as well as with UNITA.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, you think that the Cubans were very heavily involved in the drive last year?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. But that is not the general report.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. The reports I read indicate that they have been. They have had some forces involved. It may be in an advisory capacity, but certainly in forward combat areas.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, wait a minute. I want to distinguish between advisory and military combat.

Suppose the Cuban forces were actively put into military combat. How would you counter that?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I suppose what Secretary Crocker said, by the South Africans, by the forces on the ground. I don't think the United States should.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, then, you think that South African troops should come in to do that?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I'm not saying that they should, but they probably will. They are already there.

Senator SARBANES. And the United States then would be aligned with the South Africans and the South African troops.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. The United States would not have ground troops there. UNITA would be buying equipment, or be given equipment from the United States. I don't say that necessarily allies us with South Africa. And besides, as I said earlier, UNITA already has support from other African countries.

Senator SARBANES. It seems to me that Senator Biden's line of questioning earlier takes on a certain bite here. In other words, the South Africans are manipulating the situation to their advantage. I think there is no doubt that the South Africans helped to scuttle what progress was being made toward a negotiated settlement by their actions in Namibia and in Cabinda in the spring and early summer of last year.

Now the scenario you are outlining for me leaves the South Africans in a position to continue to do just that.

I take it, though, on a broader policy question, that you think an identification of the United States with the South African regime is not a matter of great concern to you. Is that correct?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It's a concern if our policy were aligned in support of apartheid. It is then of concern. If it's support of a movement that opposes a totalitarian aspiring government, such as the MPLA, then it is not of concern, not of as much concern.

It's not the choice of, it is in a sense somewhat of a necessary evil, the same way as aligning ourselves with Stalinist Russia was against Nazi Germany.

Senator SARBANES. Do you feel that we can align ourselves with South Africa and in South African fights in the region, without being aligned with the South African regime for internal purposes?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. We will not be fighting. The UNITA forces will be fighting. We would simply be lending, selling, or giving of equipment to them. I think there is a distinction there, and that reasonable people will see that distinction.

Senator SARBANES. It seems to me that South Africa here is drawing the United States into this issue in a way that cannot help but draw us in on the other issues of South Africa and southern Africa and that we will therefore, pay the price that will come with that.

Let me ask you one final question.

Do you understand Savimbi's goal to be only a negotiated settlement or do you think he would like to overthrow the MPLA if he could do it?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I would have to accept his statement when he says he wants a coalition. If he wants something beyond that—I think it's unreasonable for him to take over all of Angola.

Senator SARBANES. If he wants something beyond that, would you support him in seeking it?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I would say that the present-day MPLA government, the leadership of the government which they are trying to eventually establish in Angola, is not a good thing for the Angolan people, and is not a good thing for the United States—yes.

Senator SARBANES. So, you would support him in a broader objective?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Sure.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, you think the goal there should be the overthrow of the MPLA?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Of the present leadership of the MPLA, one that is very pro-Soviet.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, first let me ask about this.

There was a very thoughtful piece written by our colleague, Senator Mathias, in the December 8 issue of the Los Angeles Times, and I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that that be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[See appendix.]

Senator DODD. Also, one of our witnesses here, former Secretary Moose, had an article—I don't know when it appeared, though I think it was at the end of January—in the New York Times. I thought was a very thoughtful piece as well. I ask that that be a part of the record also.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[See appendix.]

Senator DODD. The other day, Mr. Savimbi, when he was here, at least on a couple of the shows that I watched him on, suggested that, while in the past he had not attacked economic targets in Angola, particularly a number of U.S. corporations that are located there—Gulf Oil, Chevron is there, too, I believe—he indicated that that policy of not hitting those targets would not necessarily be one that he would continue in the future.

How would you respond if, in fact, we move forward with a level of military assistance to Mr. Savimbi, and then he uses that assistance to hit those very targets that are U.S.-based corporations? What would be your response to that kind of development?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It might actually work the other way. Mr. Savimbi might feel that American aid is too valuable to lose simply to hit a few targets.

Senator DODD. But what if he did hit them?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. If he did hit them?

Senator DODD. It is a vitally important link. It is where they are getting the resources to pay for an awful lot of what they are doing.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. That's right.

I don't think the American Government should be in a position of protecting a company that knows full well the difficulties that it labors under. That company knows it. If it chooses to stay there under the present circumstances, then we should not be in a position of advocating protection of it, since we do not recognize Luanda and the circumstances have been well known to everyone for the last 10 years.

Senator DODD. So, if he did use those resources to hit those targets, that would sort of be tough luck and just kind of in the battle zone?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I wouldn't characterize it quite that way, but I would say that I do not think, from Mr. Savimbi's point of view, that if American lives were lost there, he would be jeopardizing

something. I am saying that it probably would act as somewhat of a restraint.

Senator DODD. I'm sorry.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It may act as a restraint.

It is not clear in my mind that there is a direct link between providing Savimbi with military equipment and his necessarily following through with an attack.

Senator DODD. But his comments, when asked about it, were that, "I haven't up to now, but I very well may." He didn't even make it a condition of whether he got assistance or not.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Right. He may do it whether we give him the aid or not.

Senator DODD. Right. I was curious about the question of whether aid was then used to finance those operations.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Well, certainly, I would not welcome the fact that Chevron or any American company would be attacked by any forces. I'm just saying that his position is that it may not happen or it may happen whether we provide aid or not. It may be incidental. It may be just a symbolic strike, enough to scare people off. I don't know.

Senator DODD. Would you consider that a terrorist act?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. There is a war between two combatants within the country that situation lends itself, I think within international law, to say it is within the realm of war rather than terrorism. We understand terrorism as against innocent civilians.

Senator DODD. But what about the innocent people who might be working in those facilities?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Well, I think they probably know what the situation is. That is not the same thing as a terrorist attack like shooting people at the Rome airport would be, shooting tourists. These people are not tourists.

Senator DODD. The fact that someone is a civilian, residing in a place where there is a conflict, sort of eliminates the definition of terrorism, then?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It lessens it in hard and fast terms, in my mind, because there is a war situation.

Senator DODD. Secretary Moose, in the last paragraph of your prepared statement, you commend the committee for holding these hearings, and I agree with you. You suggest that nothing is being contemplated that will, in reality, be covert. You are implying that because of the nature of our society, we rarely maintain covert activities; that no matter how covert they may intend to be, they usually end up being known.

I don't know if you were here when I tried to solicit what seems to me to be a basic point. It seems to me that the policy is already in place and that what may be an effort here is to sanction that policy through some form of resolution. I don't know how you interpreted Secretary Crocker's answer to my question.

My feeling was that he was as much as telling me that it is in place, that it is not a question of options, and that we are really looking for, as my colleague from Maryland pointed out, a patina to sort of wrap the policy in through a resolution.

Is that your understanding as well?

Mr. MOOSE. Yes; I thought that was a very pertinent line of questioning. It is certainly the most widely advertised and announced in advance program of clandestine, covert assistance that I think we have ever known. Covert assistance is not what it used to be in the old days, since Nicaragua. I think what "covert" now means is that everybody knows about it, but it is deniable. I think this is one of the ways they talk about it in the Executive Branch.

One of the ironies it seems to me, if I may be historical for just a moment, has to do with the Clark amendment. This is not an appeal to revive the Clark amendment, however. I started to talk about the amendment in my prepared statement but I decided I had best leave it out lest I be thought to be nostalgic. But there is an irony here since the Clark amendment never prohibited covert assistance in Angola.

If you go back and read the language of the Clark amendment, it merely said that if the executive branch wanted to do something in Angola—and it didn't specify covert or otherwise—it must come up to the Congress, the executive was obliged to describe what it was that it proposed to do, and give the Congress a chance to vote on it by joint resolution. The amendment, incidentially permitted humanitarian assistance.

Nowhere did the Clark amendment say that you could not have a covert program. It simply said that the executive had to come up and get a joint resolution. It did not even require authorization and appropriation in the usual way, just describe in detail what you are going to do, and both Houses would act on it. Then the executive could go ahead. It prohibited nothing.

Thus far no administration has been willing to come up here to try that; even to this day they appear unwilling to come and try it.

Senator DODD. Help me out historically.

I have forgotten whether or not the Clark amendment was adopted prior to the reforms in the establishment of the Intelligence Committees here in Congress.

Mr. MOOSE. I think the Clark amendment was adopted in midprocess. It came after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had gained—with much difficulty—the right to be included in the briefings that were given to the Intelligence Committees. I believe the Clark amendment came before the formal change in which there was a broadened intelligence oversight committee. That is my recollection.

Senator DODD. I thank both of you for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Are there any further questions?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. We thank both of you gentlemen for your patience and for your excellent testimony.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHESTER A. CROCKER

Mr. Chairman,

I welcome this opportunity to speak to this committee today about the complex situation in southwestern Africa. The Angola/Namibia negotiations form an essential part of our policy for the region. Our objectives are clear: to restore and advance U.S. influence in the region; to expand our cooperative relations with African states; and to deny to the Soviet Union the opportunity to use its influence to exacerbate already dangerous situations in Angola, South Africa, and the other countries of the area.

It is obvious, I believe, to all in this room that our interests and objectives are decidedly not served by a Namibia which is not free and by an Angola which is the scene of a bloody conflict and foreign intervention. Thus, we have worked hard to bring peace to Angola and independence to Namibia. In recent years we have made progress in pursuit of our goals. Allow me to review with you the path we have followed and where we are today.

In 1981, at the start of this Administration, there was no peace process at all underway in south-western Africa. The quest for Namibian independence was moribund, South Africa sat seemingly unmovable on its side of the Angolan/Namibian border while some 30,000 Cubans sat across on their side of the same border. UNITA was fighting an apparently endless civil war. No one was talking to anyone else.

This blocked situation posed real dangers to the region and US interests there. The absence of a viable western strategy for Namibia decolonization and the presence of a seemingly permanent Soviet-Cuban military presence in Angola risked heightened polarization and open-ended opportunities for Moscow to exploit African frustration over Namibia and fuel internal and regional tensions. It was essential that we regain the initiative.

It took two years to engage Luanda and Pretoria in a real negotiation. It took another year to begin to erode the mutual mistrust and build confidence in an American role. But with the Lusaka Accord of February '84, the South Africans began the process of disengagement from their military positions in Angola in return for restraint by SWAPO. In November of the

same year, the Angolans said they were ready to commit themselves to withdraw 20,000 Cuban troops over three years, starting with the beginning of implementation of UNSCR 435, the internationally agreed independence plan for Namibia. While this proposal was in itself not sufficient to conclude an agreement, it was an important step forward in that Luanda had accepted the principle that the independence of Namibia could only take place in the context of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

It is therefore important to note that by early 1985, we had made real progress in devising and gaining acceptance for a framework for resolving the dual question of Namibian independence and Cuban troop presence in Angola. I would emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that this progress in the years 1981-85 helped thwart Soviet goals of advancing its positions in southern Africa. Moscow did not encourage our efforts on Angola and has clearly been placed on the defensive there, in Mozambique and elsewhere. However, the negotiating process has always moved in fits and starts and has been characterized by mutual suspicion among the parties to the conflict - South Africa, the MPLA, UNITA, and SWAPO -- and by continuing efforts, sometimes more intense than others, to pursue the military options. Moscow has fuelled distrust and fear among the local parties.

Thus, after we tabled fresh compromise proposals -- a synthesis of both South African and Angolan ideas on the timing and sequencing of Cuban troop withdrawal -- in March, 1985, each of the parties pulled back from taking the tough decisions needed to advance the process. In South Africa, a government, under heavy pressure from internal protest and increasing international isolation, pursued other means to accomplish its ends, including greater emphasis on military operations within Angola. The MPLA government in Luanda, bouyed by a massive infusion of Soviet equipment, also retreated from the negotiating path. The result was a major MPLA military thrust into southern Angola in late 1985 which was marked by greater Soviet involvement and South African participation in support of UNITA than had been witnessed before.

We believe that fighting brought home to both sides the dangers of military escalation. In recent months we have had several important meetings with both the MPLA and the South African Government in which the negotiating context has been further defined. We are not yet at the point of success, and, frankly, prospects in such a complex enterprise as these negotiations must always be viewed as problematical.

These negotiations, and the continuing warfare inside Angola and across its borders into Namibia, represent the backdrop against which the visit of Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA occurred. Dr. Savimbi's visit has generated a lot of public interest and some debate, much of it divorced from the political and military realities of southern Africa. Dr. Savimbi spoke effectively on his own behalf and most of you had the opportunity to hear him directly. He told us he had a very useful visit and was returning to Angola with high morale and no doubts about the Administration's support for his efforts. We do support UNITA; it has sustained a long and brave fight against Soviet and Cuban political and military designs. Our reception of him here was an element of that support. It sent a strong signal to Luanda and Moscow that the U.S. views UNITA as a nationalist organization with legitimate aspirations of playing a role in the process of national reconciliation that must come about if Angola is eventually to achieve real peace. We intend to be supportive of UNITA in an effective and appropriate manner. As the President said in his State of the Union message: we want to support all those fighting for freedom.

And, as the President said in his important speech to the

United Nations General Assembly in October of last year, we view the Soviet Union as having a responsibility to take action to defuse situations of regional tension which have been made worse by its own policies. We will continue to make that point to Moscow through direct communication and otherwise as well.

Some may perceive that the reception Savimbi received here signals a change in U.S. policy. It does not. Our strategy recognizes that the scene on the ground in Angola has changed, largely owing to Soviet actions, and that our ability to respond diplomatically and in other ways has been measurably increased by the repeal of the Clark amendment, effective October 1, 1985. However, I want to categorically state here that the basis and goals of our policy remain unchanged: we seek negotiated solution that will bring independence to Namibia and withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Such a solution opens the way for Angolans to reconcile and achieve peace.

Allow me to say a few words about the broader context of our policy. First, we do not believe that in a contemporary period, as in any other period, that diplomacy and pressure represent polar opposites or alternative strategies. This is also the case in southern Africa where virtually all parties

pursue their interests through a wide variety of means.

Inevitably, perhaps, both the South Africans and the Angolans are pursuing several tracks of policy to advance their interests. The same can be said about UNITA and the MPLA as they contend over the future of Angola.

For our part, we recognize that our diplomacy plays out against a backdrop of real and tangible pressures that exist on the ground. For the past several years, we have worked to create a political framework for the ultimate resolution of the intertwined problems of Angola and Namibia. At the level of general principles, we have succeeded.

All of the parties now accept that there is a real connection between Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence. They accept that lack of movement on one side is an obstacle to the solution of other problems. But we have not yet been able to translate that into detailed accords specifying the timing and sequencing of Cuban troop withdrawal in relation to South Africa's commitments under Res. 435.

It remains our analysis that neither the South African Government nor the government in Angola nor SWAPO nor UNITA can

accomplish their goals through outright military victory. The only ones to benefit by continued warfare are the Soviets and Cubans. Hence, the continuing relevance of a political framework. That framework offers a context for the multiple political, military and economic pressures at play. However, that does not mean that the parties will not on occasion try to solve their problems via the deceptively easy way of escalating the war.

This past year we have seen the MPLA government, strongly backed by Moscow and Havana, pursue such an escalation. They sought to reverse two years of UNITA gains and deal a body blow to that movement. They failed. It is important in our view that they continue to fail. Just as we are determined that our diplomacy not be used by the South Africans, as a cover for the pursuit of other objectives, we feel the same way about the government in Luanda.

The point I am making, then, is that diplomacy requires to be effective a degree of pressure that drives the parties towards a political compromise. But pressure -- pure physical power -- does not in itself represent solutions, and in our analysis cannot be effective in the absence of a meaningful political context. As Secretary Shultz has put it, it takes both power <u>and</u> diplomacy.

While here, Dr. Savimbi stated his view that there is no possibility for either side in Angola to gain an outright military victory and that national reconciliation will have to come about through a process of negotiation. He emphasized that UNITA does not wish to destroy the MPLA. UNITA, he said, seeks rather to convince the leaders in Luanda of the need to compromise and reach a political settlement. We share Dr. Savimbi's belief that there are no military solutions in Angola. And he affirmed to us his support for our efforts, which focus on the linked issues of Resolution 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal, to provide the political context necessary to achieve peace and reconcilation in Angola.

Mr. Chairman, it is appropriate that this committee review the situation in Angola and U.S. policy to that troubled part of the world. It is, of course, up to the committee to decide what position it wishes to take on this issue. I would like to suggest, however, that America's best interests would be served by a clear statement from Congress that this country is committed to negotiated resolutions in southern Africa but that our willingness to negotiate should not be used by others to pursue their own aggressive ends. In this regard, and keeping in mind the words of Dr. Savimbi when he visited here, I think it important that our government, both the executive and

legislative branches, make clear that we support those who fight for freedom and political solutions. How that support should be manifested is a topic for further legislative - executive cooperation and consultation.

At this time, I would be pleased to answer your questions or provide additional detail as requested.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. MOOSE

The Angola debate is an odd and asymmetrical one. It is odd in the sense that, although the debate ostensibly concerns Africa, those who precipitated and pursue it generally evidence little knowledge or concern about the continent or its people. Their overriding objective appears to be to recast the conduct of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in a sharply aggressive mode.

It is probably the ideological nature of the Savimbi issue which accounts for the asymmetry of the current debate. One side argues the ideological issues to which it is attached, while the other invokes a set of regional considerations and interests which it believes are threatened by the application of the narrowly ideological policies. One side of the argument is deceptively simple: if one opposes Communism, then one should back Mr. Savimbi because he is fighting the Communists. By contrast, the other side of the argument is devoid of emotional appeal, and is far more complex since it requires the explantion of a number of obscure and complicated realities. Moreover, to question whether we should provide aid to 'freedom fighters' is an unattractive and perhaps risky proposition. Rarely, of course, is anyone prepared to make a public case in favor of correct relations with the Peoples Republic of Angola and its government led by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

Because this is such a peculiarly misshapen debate, I do not believe the public yet understands the real underlying issues. Instead, in our peculiarly American manner, we appear to be well on the way to making a major foreign policy decision on the basis of how

we feel about an obscure foreigner -- someone about whom 999 Americans out of 1,000 know little or nothing.

I am pleased to be invited here this morning to discuss these issues precisely because I believe that this Committee has the obligation and the capacity, as it has had in the past, to unravel such complexities, to assess the very different arguments and to identify the national interest. In so doing, the Committee can once again perform a great service to the nation on this same subject just as it did ten years ago.

The way the Angola debate has evolved, one side seems to be saying that fighting Communism, wherever and by whatever means, should be the paramount objective of our policy in any region. The other side rejects that prescription in this instance because fighting by Mr. Savimbi's side would mean working with South Africa. Both considerations are important and they are by no means mutually exclusive. I believe that it is possible for the United States to pursue a policy which combines the two and which builds on the constructive relationship which only the industrialized democracies can offer to the nations of the area. The pursuit of such a policy, to include dislodging the Cubans, is well within our ability. But acting piecemeal on Mr. Savimbi's corner of Angola is not the intelligent way to begin; if we wish to succeed, we must look first at Angola and our options there in a regional context.

If we pursue the course advocated by Mr. Savimbi's supporters, or attempt to mix covert intervention with our current diplomatic efforts, we risk enmeshing ourselves in a situation which will be messy, costly, and from which extrication would be very difficult and success most unlikely. Aligning ourselves, de facto, with South Africa by providing aid to Mr. Savimbi would do us incalculable damage throughout Africa. Ironically, it is also a course which would entrench the position of the Cubans and Russians in Southern Africa for years to come.

The objection to our working with South Africa -- or appearing to do so -- even for a goal such as the elimination of Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola, rests on practical as well as moral grounds. We must recognize that the South African government, as presently constituted, represents an illegitimate, doomed and decaying political order. As that order collapses, South Africa's neighbors are drawn inexorably into the vortex. As the apartheid system disintegrates before our eyes, the dominance of South Africa's position in the highly interdependent regional economy means that the well-being of every state in the region is vulnerable to the action, and the misfortunes of the Pretoria administration. As the Afrikaaners flail about blindly in an effort to secure their own survival, they are compounding the misfortune of their own people and imposing increasing suffering on all their neighbors.

The process which I am describing is, in fact, the destabilization of southern Africa. It is not something brought about by the Communists. The Afrikaaners, prisoners of their own historical and cultural imperative, are destroying themselves. But, by virtue of the fact, and the manner, of Pretoria's collapse, much else is at risk -- including our own policy. Vast uncertainties, both in an economic and political sense, are being created.

The Reagan Administration has often emphasized the importance of stability in southern Africa. Unfortunately, it chose to make South Africa the centerpiece of its efforts to ensure that stability. The central importance of South Africa's role in Mr. Crocker's concept of regional stability was one of the primary justifications for constructive engagement. In theory, good relations with Pretoria would enhance the United States' ability to move South Africa toward internal reform and better relations with its neighbors. In the real world, the Afrikaaners have followed their own worst instincts, rarely giving our advice more than a token hearing, and have proceeded with their own and their neighbors' destruction. As the disintegration has progressed, our own policy and image have remained captive and hostage to Pretoria's fate and folly.

In only one instance, that of Mozambique's security agreement with South Africa and its opening to western economic and financial institutions, did the Administration come close to deriving a positive result from constructive engagement. Unfortunately, the South Africans and the U.S. Congress acted, each in its own way, to undermine what could have been a successful stroke against the Communists. The episode, while it ended badly, contains lessons relevant to our options in Angola: patient, subtle policies can succeed, but they are vulnerable to the peculiar imperatives of the South Africans and the sometimes crude and uncomprehending impulses of American politics.

By contrast, there has been little effort at subtlety in our dealings with Angola. Ten years ago, with the Ford Administration's encouragement, South Africa intervened in the struggle among Angolan factions contending for control of that country's post-independence government. The South Africans launched an effort to take Luanda because they wished to control or to determine the political complexion of the authority on the other side of their border -- actually the border of Namibia, which they hold illegally. Since 1975, the South Africans have remained continuously involved in the Angolan civil WAR. Pretoria does this in the name of "defending" Namibia against SWAPO, the principal Namibian independence movement.

As an adjunct of their own operations, the South Africans sustain Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces. South African units operate jointly with UNITA, and provide them with air cover. In response, the only substantial outside assistance the Luanda government has been able to muster has come from the Russians and Cubans. This assistance had its large scale beginning at the time of the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 and has continued ever since, fluctuating roughly in parallel with the level of South African operations.

The Ford Administration did not seek to maintain diplomatic representation in Luanda after independence and made no move to establish formal relations following its abortive intervention of 1975-6. There were a number of contacts with high level Angolan officials during the Carter Administration, usually in the context of Namibia negotiations, but formal recognition was not forthcoming. President Carter himself was equivocal on the subject and, in the end, was persuaded that the move would open him to attack by political conservatives. Thus, the United States remains the only major nation in the world which does not recognize the Luanda government.

When the Reagan Administration set its hand to southern Africa, it chose to link its efforts to negotiate independence for Namibia with the question of Cuban troops in Angola. The South Africans were told that we would not press them to grant Namibia its independence until the Cubans had left Angola. Since the South Africans do not want to leave Namibia, they have simply applied continuous military pressure to ensure that the Angolans would not ask the Cubans to go.

Meanwhile Pretoria's ongoing support of Savimbi has prevented the Luanda authorities from governing the country and from organizing and financing a development effort. Although Savimbi is an authentic regional leader, Luanda will certainly not deal with him as long as he is allied with Pretoria. Whether the MPLA would talk with him if Pretoria was not involved is a question to which we do not know the answer. On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that Savimbi will concede anything to Luanda so long as he believes South Africa and the United States might back him in an effort to obtain a military victory over the MPLA. And that is precisely the type of support Mr. Savimbi was led to expect by some of his friends during his recent visit here.

It is suggested that we may be able to "wean" Mr. Savimbi away from Pretoria. This strategy presumably would entail our assuming full responsibility for his support.

Presumably, we would still want UNITA troops, not ours, to do the fighting. Under these circumstances the Cubans would likely remain. Moreover, the inescapable effect of our joining or replacing the South African Defense Forces would be to reinforce the perception that the United States is fighting South Africa's battles. And we would be. When South Africa's internal chaos reaches the point where its army has to be brought back from its borders to suppress the black population, the United States will be left holding Mr. Savimbi's hand and fighting Pretoria's rear guard action.

By joining Savimbi for the ostensible purpose of combatting Communism, we would also, in effect, be taking up arms against Namibian independence, a goal embraced by the last five U.S. administrations. UNITA, together with the South Africans' "defense" forces, fights SWAPO just as it does the Luanda government. Some Americans, of course, would say that SWAPO is a Communist led movement and thus the United States should fight it as well. But whatever one thinks of SWAPO as an organization, its cause is just. South Africa has not the slightest legal basis for continuing to occupy Namibia. Rejecting SWAPO's claim to be the legitimate representative of the Namibian people would be one thing; attacking it militarily is quite another.

Furthermore, if we were to fight with Savimbi against Luanda and SWAPO on the grounds that they are Marxist led, the United States would then be but a short step away from supporting military action against the African Nationalist Congress (ANC). Again, there must be many among Mr. Savimbi's patrons here to whom that proposition is not at all unreasonable — if not positively appealing. But I cannot believe responsible Members such as yourselves would welcome that prospect, no matter how disturbing you may find the ANC's rhetoric.

The possible progression of events which I have projected is neither forced nor contrived. What I am describing is what the rest of Africa -- and most of the world --

will perceive once we are committed to Savimbi. And, in reality, we will be lifting a burden from Pretoria's shoulders the minute we commit ourselves to UNITA. Gun for gun, radio for radio, any war material Pretoria does not have to send to Savimbi or Namibia is available for use against its own black population.

More important than the financial relief which the South Africans would derive from our intervention would be the tremendous psychological lift which it would afford them. While this Administration has previously used its votes to protect South Africa in the United Nations, joining forces with the Afrikaaners in Angola would carry immeasurably greater meaning. No longer would they be standing alone in the spotlight of the world's opprobrium -- the United States would be there to keep them company.

Against this background, I believe that the point of departure for a sound Angola policy would be the elimination of South Africa as a factor in Angola's internal affairs. This would mean getting South African forces out of Angola immediately and putting an end to their support for Savimbi. Forceful steps toward those ends would provide the necessary basis for our arranging with Luanda for the departure of the Cuban combat forces. Having once engaged ourselves in a legitimate and convincing manner on behalf of Angola's territorial integrity, the United States would be well positioned to deal seriously with the MPLA on the question of reconciliation with UNITA.

Until we can bring ourselves to recognize and confront the South African role in Angola, we had just as well reconcile ourselves to the Cubans and Russians remaining there. Doing nothing would indeed be preferable to adopting the opposite course of joining or replacing the South Africans as is now being urged. To put ourselves in that position would be more than the Russians could hope for. In fact, I sometimes wonder whether Savimbi, educated in Marxism and trained by the Maoists, is not still the Communists' secret weapon in southern Africa.

If we join Savimbi, we will be turning the clock back to 1975. Do we really want to do that? It is not as though we do not know what will happen, for we have been through it before. By our intervention in 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger sought to demonstrate that America had not lost its will following the collapse of South Vietnam. Ten years later, other Americans are again seeking to prove something to the Russians, or to the conservative political constituency, by re-intervening in Angola.

Curiously enough, Mr. Savimbi, when he was here, perceived more astutely than his local admirers that few Americans want to get close to South Africa, and that most Americans really don't want to fight anybody. In his public appearances, Mr. Savimbi played down his military objectives and emphasized the goal of entering into talks with the MPLA authorities in Luanda. That benign objective is much easier for Americans to relate to: we are always in favor of folks sitting down and talking out their differences. That is, after all, the American way. The Administration, taking its lead from Mr. Savimbi, now emphasizes the importance of political talks looking toward reconciliation of the Angolan factions. Moderation such as this, however, does little to satisfy the appetite of Mr. Savimbi's more bellicose supporters.

The State Department, caught between good sense and the Right wing, is talking tougher while trying to protect the diplomatic initiatives now underway. The Executive Branch showed its support for Mr. Savimbi by letting him chat with the President. Now the Congress can pass a resolution to tell Savimbi that it, too, cares and to ask the President to help him. Presumably this will justify a program of covert assistance which can be turned on and off, or denied, at will. Meanwhile, the State Department will pursue its talks with the Angolans and the South Africans concerning Namibia, a Cuban withdrawal timetable and political reconciliation. If Luanda is reluctant to talk, we will apply military pressure through UNITA.

These tactics may be viable for a time, but at some point our romance with Mr. Savimbi may become so heated that Luanda can no longer overlook it. Indeed, the statements emanating from Washington these days cannot but further impair Luanda's confidence in us as honest brokers. Meanwhile, the South Africans will continue to hope that the American politics will once again save them from having to withdraw from Angola and Namibia. In any event, U.S. strategy remains totally vulnerable to the type of South African sabotage which has immobilized it up to now.

While the Administration's strategy hangs by these slender threads, the formulas of Mr. Savimbi's American boosters, depending on which version one chooses, range from totally illogical to downright dangerous. While competing with one another for the honor of praising Mr. Savimbi, they are by no means in agreement with one another as to goals. Some would have the U.S. back UNITA in seeking a military victory. Others, less ambitious, speak of "bleeding the Soviets" or "making the Soviets pay". Yet others, those with whom the State Department apparently agrees, would settle for improving Mr. Savimbi's -- or the United States' -- bargaining position. These various options involve strikingly different degrees of expectation, commitment, cost and risk. The Committee should examine these in some detail. The upper end of the cost/risk scale could be very high indeed.

If the Committee can determine the likely price of an intervention of sufficient magnitude to drive the Russians and Cubans out of Angola, the figure will certainly prove unsupportable. In February, 1976, your predecessors on this Committee were told by the Executive Branch that an effort to "win" in Angola would cost hundreds of millions of (1976) dollars and require vast numbers of ground forces. On the other hand, if we opt for a token effort -- humanitarian, or $27 million worth of arms -- we must ask ourselves what can be achieved. The Russians may have to spend something themselves, but whatever it costs them will be a bargain given the distress and embarrassment in which

the United States will soon find itself. Neither a lot of intervention, nor just a little bit, makes sense: either way, the Russians are more likely to be pleased than frightened.

I hope that I have gone part way to establishing at least that there are issues here far more complex than sending arms to Jonas Savimbi to fight Communists. It is good that the Committee is bringing the Angolan question into the open for nothing that is being contemplated will, in reality, be covert. That being the case, there is no reason not to examine the matter in detail. Appealing "whereas" clauses often conceal gaps of fact and lapses of logic. Some of the most unfortunate policy of the last two decades has been made in secret and confirmed by resolution -- as the records of this Committee have so clearly established.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN

I welcome the opportunity to testify before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the importance of financial and military aid to UNITA (União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola). In my opinion there are cogent and compelling reasons for the United States to back a movement opposed to a Marxist regime in Africa, established and maintained by massive Soviet and Cuban intervention.

Before listing briefly these reasons for American assistance, it is useful to summarize the historical background to the present-day situation in Angola and UNITA's status. Angola, a former Portuguese colony until 1975, achieved its independence in the wake of the military coup in Lisbon. In late April, 1974 Portuguese army

officers, disillusioned with fighting an anti-guerrilla war from more than a decade in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique as well as Angola, overthrew the Caetano government in Lisbon. Independence came soon after for Portugal's African colonies. But unlike Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the Angolan independence movement was deeply divided between three separate groups.

Each of these groups had waged guerrilla war against the colonial army and each had made territorial claims to different regions of the Angolan landscape during the course of the independence struggle, which began in a sporadic fashion from three separate revolts in 1961. The first nationalist party to begin guerrilla operations after these early revolts was led by Holden Roberto and ultimately became known as the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola). It reportedly has launched some minor military operations in Angola's northeast corner during the recent past.

In 1966, two other Angolan movements opened fronts. One of these groups was UNITA and the other the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), which today is the embattled government. The MPLA, or as it is known today, the MPLA-PT (the PT meaning Partido do Trabalho or Labor Party), was formed in 1956 with collaboration of the Portuguese Communist Party. The MPLA drew its support from the Mbundu people in the area east of Luanda and from residents of the capital itself. It leadership tended to be mestiço, that is to say, those of African and European parentage. The third nationalist group was UNITA which was formed by Jonas Savimbi, the onetime foreign minister of Roberto. He broke with the FNLA and estalished UNITA which initially received much of its support from the Ovimbundu people. UNITA, during the anti-colonial struggle, operated mainly in the southeast corner of the country. The three nationalist groups tended to engage the colonial forces within their respective geographical areas. They also fought each other from time to time along with fighting the Portuguese forces, so intense was their rivalry.

During the last months of the Portuguese presence in Angola, the

representatives from Lisbon created a coalition government in the Alvor Agreement, which was made up of the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. Signed on January 15, 1975, the Alvor Agreement had a short life. The Transitional Government, which the agreement established, was set up in Luanda by late March. It unraveled in less than a month as clashes broke out between the MPLA and the FNLA. Savimbi held aloof, believing, with good reason, that he could win the pre-independence elections. By summer the MPLA had expelled both its rivals from the capital. And by the beginning of October (with less than six weeks to go before independence), the MPLA, armed with the newly arrived Soviet weapons and reinforced by the first wave of Cuban support and combat troops, stood poised for a military victory.

The intervention of South African forces into Angola on October 23 put in place the major players in the current Angolan situation (the best study of the sequence and timing of foreign intervention into Angola remains, Colin Legum, "The Role of the Big Powers," After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa. New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976). Since 1975, UNITA has expanded the area of operations beyond the southeastern quadrant and the MPLA has become evermore reliant on Soviet, East German and Cuban bayonets to sustain its decreasing sway in the countryside. As UNITA's strength and domain increased, the MPLA's military capability has decreased, posing a dangerous situation for the communists. UNITA's successes have forced the Soviet bloc to come to the aid of their beleagured client. During the last two years, the MPLA has received up to $2 billion in military equipment (New York Times, December 30). And this past summer, the MPLA, bolstered with about 7,000 additional Cuban troops for a total of some 35,000 Cuban soldiers, launched a major offensive to defeat UNITA forces. Although the MPLA campaign failed, its power remains checked temporarily by the rainy season. With the ending of inclimate weather in March, the Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, jet planes and helicopter gunships together with Cuban troops and Russian advisers will once more be unleased against UNITA forces.

The considerations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

therefore, are urgent. Military and humanitarian assistance to UNITA is of the utmost necessity for the following reasons:

1. The United States wherever possible must provide moral and material support to peoples struggling against communist-aided governments. Otherwise, in the case of Angola, we as a nation accept a Soviet dominated and a communist state eventually analogous to that which is present in Eastern Europe. Military aid should be in the range of $25-30 million and be used especially for anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Humanitarian assistance should also be in the $25-30 million range and could be used to purchase medicines, food and clothing.

2. UNITA has long formed, and will continue to form, an important factor in Angolan politics. UNITA deserves to be strengthened on account of its hostility to the USSR and Cuba, both open and avowed opponents of the United States.

3. The continued viability of UNITA is the best guarantee that the MPLA will not have the resources to make mischief in the states bordering Angola. As the historical record shows, communist states, especially when exempt from foreign pressure, have tended to export revolution to neighboring countries or even around the world. Should the MPLA triumph over the UNITA, we can expect communist-backed insurgencies elsewhere in Africa to enjoy MPLA support. Angola already provides bases to SWAPO (Southwest African People's Organization) to strike into Namibia.

4. The downfall of the MPLA will provide the greatest single factor toward the promotion of independence in Namibia from South African control. South Africa will not willingly allow a Marxist Namibian government to establish itself, lest such a government in turn support communists insurgencies within South Africa itself. The removal of a powerfully backed Soviet client state in Angola will remove South Africa justification for continued occupation of Namibia. Likewise, the reduction of tensions which would follow the collapse of the MPLA

lessens Pretoria's well-founded concerns of communist-backed raids and sabotage on its soil which are staged by the ANC (African National Congress). It is an established fact that the ANC is closely allied with the South African Communist Party. The removal of such concerns also would help to remove South African's concerns and justifications against granting more freedoms to its own black population.

5. Much is often made of the allegation that American aid to UNITA aligns the United States with racist South Africa which also provides much support to Savimbi and UNITA. In my opinion, this is a non-issue. First, Savimbi has made it clear on several occasions that necessity, not South African racial policies, requires him to accept South African aid. Second, other states in addition to South Africa provide UNITA with assistance. Third, if anything, American support lessens UNITA's dependence on South Africa. During times of global struggle, the United States should not abstain from supporting a movement opposed to communism, just because that movement receives support from a country whose domestic policies offend our democratic values. When in its infancy, the United States accepted aid from monarchical France while it fought against colonial rule of George III. During World War Two, we were allied with Stalinist Russia against Nazi Germany. Finally, the United States is not aligning itself with South Africa by providing an anti-communist movement support any more than it is aligning itself with radical Islam by providing support to Afghan freedom fighters who oppose a Soviet occupation of their country.

6. Some critics of aid to UNITA may argue that American aid to Savimbi's group is a wasted effort since UNITA has no chance of winning. There is no weaker argument for opposition to assistance from the United States. By extension, should we have denied aid to Britain during the Second World War because Hitler's forces appeared triumphant? UNITA, in fact, has proved much more viable than it seemed ten years ago. It may ultimately force a collapse of the present-day MPLA leadership or a place within an Angolan coalition government, which is the UNITA goal. Most importantly, the United

States must not withhold aid from people who have their lives on the line against communist. To do so, we would not be a great power. Nor would we be deserving of a worthy judgment of history.

7. Some critics of the United States aid to UNITA (such as Williamson M. Evers in Wall Street Journal, February 11, 1986) argue that the United States should not support Savimbi because he is a socialist, critical of private enterprise. United States foreign policy should not, however, enter into an uncritical crusade in favor of Adam Smith's views or of some form of libertarian economics. In the past the United States, for instance, has given aid to Marshall Tito, not because the United States necessarily agreed with Tito's economic policies, but because Tito defended his country's independence from Moscow. Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China have improved in a gratifying fashion. UNITA's commitment to a mixed economy, with a strong socialist component, should not, therefore--on its own--disqualify UNITA from receiving U.S. aid.

The United States, in my opinion, should provide both military and economic assitance to UNITA as soon as possible. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

[62] P. T. Bauer, Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 134.

[63] Agency for International Development, Local Conditions Beyond AID's Control and Repeated Design, Planning and Monitoring Deficiencies Have Seriously Delayed the Implementation of Projects by USAID/Guatemala (Washington, May 23, 1984), p. 5.

[64] Washington Post, June 24, 1985.

[65] P. T. Bauer, Reality and Rhetoric (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 104.

[66] World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 1981), p. 25.

[67] Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1985.

[68] Toward Sustained Development.

[69] New York Times, November 18, 1984.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Guardian, August 1, 1983.

[72] World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, 1985), pp. 20, 21.

[73] Wall Street Journal, September 17, 1985.

[74] Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1985.

[75] Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Southey's Colloquies on Society," Edinburgh Review (1830).

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(L.A. Times, Sunday, December 8, 1985)

No Meddling in Angola

Aid to Rebels Would Upset All Our Gains in Africa

By CHARLES McC. MATHIAS JR.

Whenever someone begins talking about Angola, as members of Congress seem to be doing again for the first time in a decade, I always think of Daniel Gearhart.

Gearhart was an idealistic young man who signed up to fight in Angola in 1976 when the current government was installed with Soviet and Cuban backing. Like a lot of soldiers of fortune, he didn't know much about what he was getting into before he landed in the thick of a very nasty civil war. Gearhart was executed by a firing squad July 10, 1976. His war lasted three days, and was apparently without action before he was captured and put on trial. Because he was a Marylander and I had sympathy for his family, I flew to Portugal in an effort to reach Angola and make a personal plea for his life. My request for a visa was denied by the Angolan government.

So, in a personal sense, one would suspect that I would be attracted to current efforts to put the U.S. government back into Angola's civil war. Some members of Congress want open military aid to the forces behind Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. Others want so-called humanitarian aid. The President has said he favors giving covert aid to Savimbi.

The appropriate response to all three of these options is "none of the above." Active U.S. intervention in Angola—in anything but the most creative diplomatic sense—is not in our national interest. It would destroy our credibility as a mediator in this strife-torn region. Our contacts with the major countries in the area, already frayed by the scant results of "constructive engagement," would dry up. Any chance of reaching a settlement on Namibia would be dashed. We would sacrifice our ability to talk to all sides. We would be aligning ourselves with Pretoria at the very time that Protestant and Congress have declared that South Africa's policies constitute a critical threat to our national security.

All of black Africa, which already doubts our readiness to put pressure on South Africa to change its racist—and ultimately destabilizing—system of apartheid, would lose faith in our leadership. The Organization of African Unity has declared that U.S. intervention in Angola would be considered "a hostile act."

I seriously doubt that a limited intervention would have much effect in the long term. Like it or not, the Soviet-Cuban investment in Angola has developed certain roots. And while Angola is hardly a vital Soviet interest, it is unlikely that Moscow would permit a client state to be overthrown. Escalation would make it much harder to achieve our main goal—to get the Cuban troops sent home.

I agree that our present policy is not working well. But we need to press harder in the other direction to attempt to wean the current government away from its Soviet and Cuban protectors, to create the grounds for a reconciliation between Angola's ethnic divisions. That has been the thrust of efforts toward Mozambique, and it appears to be working. Samora Machel's government is moving away from Marxist allegiances, accepting military aid from the West and opening up the economy.

The elements for a substantial shift on the part of the Angolan government are equally promising. Given today's hot rhetoric and seat-of-the-pants strategies for U.S. intervention in Angola, most Americans would be surprised to discover that Angola's largest single trading partner is not the Soviet Union or Cuba, but the United States—more than $1 billion annually. The power of economic and financial forces is immense, as the quick reaction of the South African government to problems in the rescheduling of its foreign debt demonstrated.

Some of the most vigorous boosters of U.S. aid to Angolan rebels criticize Gulf Oil and other American firms in Angola for aiding communism. They stand the actual circumstances on their head. Angola's leaders may not be Wall Street-trained venture capitalists, but they know the difference between the dynamic economies of the West and the sluggish economies of the Soviet Bloc. American companies in Angola must be allowed to broaden their role and continue to nudge Angola into more enduring ties with the West.

Even militarily, there is no compelling case for giving aid to Savimbi's forces. His legions have been doing fine for several years without U.S. aid; they recently withstood the largest assault ever mounted by Soviet and Cuban-guided Angolan troops; and the rainy season, which favors his guerrilla tactics, is just beginning.

It is tragically ironic: If this Administration's policy of constructive engagement had been more effective, South African troops would not be invading Angola. And Angola, which has repeatedly expressed interest in sending its 30,000 Cuban troops home, would be more willing to do so.

At some point, the Administration should be able to give this process a real push by establishing diplomatic relations with Angola—the only African country with which we do not have relations. An increase in our contacts and visibility would provide more accurate information and enhance our ability to influence events.

This article can't begin to examine the nature of UNITA and its charismatic but avowedly Marxist leader. But a pragmatic course of action by the United States, one that leads with our strengths, diplomatic credibility and economic vitality is certainly preferable to the simism, Rambo-like ramblings of the far right.

Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

(N.Y. Times, Thursday, January 30, 1986)

Using Savimbi To Stop Moscow

By Richard M. Moose

To understand the fuss being made in Washington over Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-Government forces in Angola, one must accept the curious reality that its significance relates not to Africa but to United States-Soviet relations. While an element of ambiguity surrounds the Administration's intentions, powerful forces are moving our Government toward intervention in the Angolan civil war. The ostensible purpose is to assist Mr. Savimbi's "freedom-fighters." The real purpose is to roll back what is seen as another Soviet expansionist threat. But intervention would fly in the face of the realities of the region and cast a fateful shadow over our relations with Moscow.

Mr. Savimbi's long journey to

The fuss is not over Africa

Washington began a decade ago with the struggle for power in post-independence Angola. In 1975, after failing in his bid for a leadership role in Angola's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a Marxist party, and then being shunned by his former Maoist mentors, he attracted the favor of Henry A. Kissinger. In 1975, he described himself to visitors as "a New Testament socialist" and began taking money from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The following year those funds were cut off when Congress adopted the Clark Amendment prohibiting covert aid to Angola. After that, Mr. Savimbi's ideological metamorphosis was completed: invariably identified as the "charismatic, fatigue-clad leader of the anti-Communist Unita guerrillas," he became the toast of many American politicians who by last summer had made aid for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola a priority objective.

The key to unlocking this aid was repeal of the Clark Amendment. Once this barrier had fallen, there was no tenable line of defense for those in the Administration who opposed intervention. Ultimately, Secretary of State George P. Shultz endorsed aid to Unita in its fight against the Luanda Government, while continuing to negotiate with the Luanda authorities for a Cuban withdrawal.

Although aid to Mr. Savimbi is the putative aim of Mr. Savimbi's American friends, their real concern is this country's global posture toward the Soviet Union. It is manifested in their unstinting support for anti-Communist insurgencies. Indeed, they regard the possibility of an understanding with the M.P.L.A. — even if it led to the withdrawal of Cuban forces — as anathema. They were outraged last fall when an African Marxist leader, President Samora Machel of Mozambique, was received by President Reagan. Mr. Savimbi's elaborate reception this week is their revenge. They hope by a show of force to strip away the ambiguity of the Administration's attitude toward anti-Communist insurgencies and to imprint their own aggressive philosophy on the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union.

There is, however, some disagreement among Mr. Savimbi's supporters as to the purpose of intervention. Some advocate the pursuit of total military victory. Others speak merely of "raising the cost" or "bleeding the Soviets." Some otherwise thoughtful moderates have convinced themselves that strengthening Unita could promote reconciliation among the Angolan factions.

These are difficult objectives, each with its own implications, costs and risks. But so far there has been no real national debate about Angola. Conservatives worry about the Russians; some of the rest of us worry about the Africans. Both concerns are legitimate; both can be accommodated in a rational policy framework.

The key element in such a framework is recognition that South Africa is the primary source of the region's instability and that the Communists are the main beneficiaries of that instability. By acting to end Pretoria's interference with its neighbors, we can effectively undercut the Soviet Union and realize the full potential of our own influence.

Ironically, the only thing the Russians can do for Angola (although they do it poorly) is the one thing America has been unwilling to do — assist Angola in defending itself against South Africa. As for Angola's other needs — food, investment, trade, technology — no country has more to offer than the United States. Judged against this backdrop, an invitation for Mr. Savimbi to visit the White House is a ludicrously inappropriate substitute for a policy. □

Richard M. Moose was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1977 to 1981.

ABROAD AT HOME | Anthony Lewis

Rhetoric and Reality

WASHINGTON

Jonas Savimbi, leader of the Unita rebels in Angola and darling of the American right, is coming to Washington this week with ruffles and drums. He will see Secretary of State Shultz, and very likely President Reagan. His admirers will hail him as a valiant fighter for democracy and enemy of Communism.

The Savimbi visit is an acute reminder of a familiar American phenomenon. That is the way a supposedly practical-minded people can mix up rhetoric and reality in foreign policy.

In reality, Mr. Savimbi is an altogether unlikely conservative hero. When he was here five years ago, he said he favored a Maoist commune system for agriculture. He told The Wall Street Journal: "You can't apply capitalism in Africa." He has shown no interest in democracy in Unita. He uses terrorist methods, including the taking of hostages and the shooting down of civilian aircraft.

Over the years Mr. Savimbi has played many ideological tunes. He has embraced Marxism, called for black power, been supported by white South Africa. He is in fact a charismatic politician whose interest is in power and is not choosy about who or what helps him. There is nothing unusual or reprehensible about that. It just does not fit the American conservatives' description of him as a "freedom fighter."

What really attracts Jack Kemp and Jeane Kirkpatrick and the rest to Mr. Savimbi, of course, is that the Angolan Government he opposes is Marxist. Moreover, it is supported by some 30,000 Cuban troops. They were first called in 11 years ago, when South Africa invaded newly-independent Angola and tried to install Unita in power. They have remained to help oppose Unita and South African incursions.

The Cubans again raise the question of rhetoric and reality. The United States wants to see them out of Angola. What is the most effective way to achieve that?

The hard-line conservatives here want to push the Cubans out by force of arms. That is, they want Mr. Savimbi to do so — with our help. Some in Congress want overt aid. The C.I.A. chief, William Casey, has been pushing for covert military support.

The alternative idea is diplomacy. The Reagan Administration has been trying for five years to work out a deal for the Cubans to leave Angola if and as South Africa leaves Namibia, the huge territory bordering Angola that it illegally occupies.

Which is more likely to get the Cubans out, war or diplomacy?

In Angola, war or diplomacy?

War has almost no chance of working: That is clear from experience. South Africa has given the Savimbi forces vast support, and used its own men and planes in Angola. The result has been to make the Angolan Government call in more Cubans and become more reliant on Soviet weapons.

Indeed, the notion that American aid can turn the military tide and achieve victory for Unita is too silly for rational discussion. Unless, that is, the supporters of the idea foresee full-scale U.S. intervention, including troops — and that they deny.

Diplomacy is enormously difficult, given the mutual suspicions. No realist can be confident of a solution. But there are reasons to think that one is possible.

South Africa has accepted in principle a Western plan for its forces to leave Namibia and the territory to become independent. But South Africa has demanded that all Cubans leave Angola in the same time frame, less than a year. Angola offered to send most of the Cubans home but insisted on keeping some in the north, notably to guard U.S. oil installations.

Last year Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, proposed a compromise: 80 percent of the Cubans to leave in one year, the remaining 20 percent the next year. Angola has not said yes to that. But in recent meetings its leaders have hinted that they might agree if South Africa sets a definite date to implement the plan for Namibia.

That record explains why Secretary Shultz wants to go on trying diplomacy. At least in words, the parties are not that far apart. South Africa just might finally agree to withdraw from Namibia — subject, of course, to Angola's then accepting the U.S. timetable for withdrawal of the Cubans.

The diplomatic route avoids the dangers of rhetorical fantasy. It does not plunge the United States into a quagmire in Angola. It does not make the U.S. a surrogate for South Africa.

But does President Reagan agree with his Secretary of State on the realistic course? We shall know better after the Savimbi visit. □

(From the Washington Post, February 9, 1986)

The Selling of Jonas Savimbi: Success and a $600,000 Tab

Public Relations Firm Paved Guerrilla's Way

By Patrick E. Tyler
and David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writers

As Angolan guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi settled back in his chair at the Capital Hilton's head banquet table last Tuesday to watch the State of the Union address on an oversized television screen, his public relations adviser tapped him on the shoulder and handed him a small index card.

On it were these words of commitment to "freedom fighters" everywhere: "America will support with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom—in Afghanistan; Angola; Cambodia and Nicaragua."

They were President Reagan's words—obtained from a bootlegged copy of the speech earlier in the day—and when they resonated from the television speakers, setting off a pounding applause in the banquet hall filled with conservative Republicans, Savimbi turned and smiled broadly at the young public relations man, former White House aide Christopher M. Lehman.

It was a climactic moment for both the 51-year-old Savimbi and his counselors at the well-connected lobbying firm, Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, which orchestrated—under a $600,000-a-year contract signed last summer—a high-profile, high-impact visit to Washington.

The selling of Savimbi began in the African bush last September and included an intricately mapped strategy to woo Congress, the administration and U.S. news media. At his distant guerrilla headquarters in Angola, Savimbi received monthly updates on the shifting political moods in Washington and on the nuances of opinion in the national media. He was meticulously coached on everything from how to answer his critics to how to compliment his patrons.

During his 10-day visit, he had as

See SAVIMBI, A8, Col. 1

much exposure on U.S. television networks and in the press as a U.S. presidential candidate. He left Washington Thursday with support from the Reagan administration that appeared virtually monolithic and a private assurance that lethal military aid will be speeding to him within a few weeks.

Savimbi's grand tour through Washington reflected not only the slick packaging of his public relations handlers, however. To the president and the strong conservative movement in the Republican Party, Savimbi's time—suspended since a 1976 ban on U.S. involvement in Angola—had come.

By Savimbi's standard, the trip was a big success. It was not, however, unblemished. He was hounded by demonstrators and snubbed by the Congressional Black Caucus for accepting military support from South Africa's white apartheid government. It was also revealed during his visit that two of the three U.S. intelligence agencies contend that Savimbi can't win on the battlefield in Angola against the Marxist government.

Furthermore, and perhaps most disappointing to him, when Savimbi left the country yesterday on a private jet loaned by an unidentified Texas multimillionaire, he failed to carry home a congressional resolution of support, which was seen as a key element in the strategy of his congressional backers and the administration.

As the political crosscurrents in Washington would have it, Savimbi's aid request became ensnared in the mutual suspicions of his conservative Republican supporters and the State Department's Africa bureau, led by Assistant Secretary Chester A. Crocker. At the same time, the administration, seeking an open congressional blessing for its covert aid program, was attempting to bypass hesitant congressional intelligence oversight committees, where some influential members were insisting on a public debate on Angola.

By the end of the week, the principal unresolved Washington policy struggle over Angola was being played out very much behind the scenes: A dozen senators, led by Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), had warned Secretary of State George P. Shultz that unless he made a concrete commitment to supply Savimbi covertly with the lethal weapons he requested to fight Soviet-built tanks and assault helicopters, they would push to supply such military aid openly.

Despite the snafu on Capitol Hill, it appeared certain that within a few weeks, according to Senate and Pentagon sources, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon will secretly begin funneling antitank and antiaircraft weaponry of foreign manufacture—as well as nonlethal items—to Savimbi's guerrilla organization, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

On Thursday evening, in Savimbi's second private meeting with the secretary of state and his African affairs advisers, the rebel leader is thought to have received a pledge that lethal covert aid would arrive at UNITA's camps in southeastern Angola in a matter of weeks. "Shultz is totally on board," one Republican Senate aide said.

More than anything last week, the reemergence of this burly African guerrilla leader struck official Washington with a sense of deja vu. To many liberals, he was the man whose losing cause a decade ago embodied what had gone wrong with the CIA and its never-ending quest to entangle the United States in yet another clandestine war in a distant bushland.

But to conservatives, Savimbi was one of the noble anticommunist heroes abandoned by America during a destructive post-Watergate era of institutional mistrust for the CIA, a period of national introspection and doubt. A number of these conservatives had worked steadily over the years to bring Savimbi back.

Savimbi, a guerrilla since 1966 who once predicted his victory might take until the end of the century, has been patient. In 1977, he told Washington Post reporter Leon Dash that "geopolitics will force [the Americans] to come back to me." Nevertheless, he made futile pilgrimages to Washington in 1979 and 1981, seeking aid after the cutoff 10 years ago.

It was not until mid-1985 that events gave Savimbi a new opportunity to draw attention to his cause. Congressional conservatives scored a sudden victory in July when they won repeal of the Clark amendment, named for then-senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa) who had rallied the Senate against the CIA's clandestine support for UNITA.

This development came atop U.S. frustration over the lack of a negotiated peace in southern Africa and intelligence reports indicating that the 35,000 Cuban and Soviet troops supporting the Angolan army were inflicting heavy casualties on Savimbi's forces.

Prodded by his battlefield losses, Savimbi pursued an idea that had always offended some members of his guerrilla organization: He began shopping for an influential Washington lobbying firm to assist in prying open the aid pipeline from the United States. It did not take long to find help.

Of the three Lehman brothers who have worked in the Reagan administration, Christopher Lehman, 37, is lesser known than his older brother, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr., but both followed similar paths through the national security bureaucracy in Washington. Most recently, Christopher Lehman was a special assistant to the president for national security affairs, lining up support in Congress for the president's defense budgets, arms sales and covert assistance programs to the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, or contras.

On a Friday afternoon last September, Lehman left his White House office for the last time. The following Monday he was on a transatlantic flight with his new boss, Paul Manafort, to a rendezvous in the African bush. The meeting had been set up by Savimbi's Washington outpost. Manafort, a former Reagan campaign aide, hoped to land a new client whose time had come.

The trip was almost aborted when Manafort and Lehman arrived at the meeting place near the Angolan border to find Savimbi locked in a fierce battle to defend his UNITA stronghold at Jamba from combined Angolan and Cuban assault forces. But Savimbi—considering the battle in Washington of equal importance to the one in the bush—left his troops for several days of negotiations with Manafort and Lehman.

They returned to Washington a week later with a signed $600,000 contract.

The strategy that emerged from Savimbi's September consultation with his new P.R. counselors was a three-pronged attack in Washington on Congress, the executive branch and the mass media—to "wake up" America to the plight of the aging Angolan "freedom fighter" facing a better-equipped, Soviet-backed army bent on his extinction.

While Savimbi concentrated on defending his Angolan stronghold, his new Washington advisers, strongly supported by conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Security Council, began the quiet drive to get Savimbi on the Reagan administration agenda. In meetings at the White House, State Department, CIA and Capitol, they sought statements of support from the president and members of Congress and to pressure the State Department's reluctant African bureau. They also sought to include Angola as one of the "regional conflicts" to be discussed at the November summit talks between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

A key element of the firm's campaign was to encourage the CIA to reestablish a strong presence in southern Africa. The firm also proposed a covert assistance program for Savimbi that would begin as nonlethal intelligence-sharing and develop into a full-scale weapons supply. In CIA Director William J.Casey, they found a willing ally.

In the news media, the firm encouraged interest in Savimbi and offered CBS News' "60 Minutes" program exclusive access to Savimbi in the bush for a broadcast planned to coincide with Savimbi's trip to the United States.

Savimbi, who has always been an articulate and forceful advocate for his cause, was coached on the strengths and weaknesses of his image here.

But wholly apart from this public relations effort, senior officials in the Reagan administration were conducting a review of Angolan policy. On Oct. 3, CIA Director Casey ordered a special national intelligence estimate on Soviet intentions in Angola. By Oct. 9, according to well-informed sources, a meeting of senior interagency advisers recommended to the president and his National Security Council a covert support program for Savimbi to counter the buildup of Soviet-equipped forces.

President Reagan approved an initial $13 million two-stage covert program on Nov. 12, with nonlethal aid to be followed in a few months by weaponry for Savimbi.

As congressional forces lined up on either side of the issue, Savimbi prepared for his entrance in Washington. At stake was the battle for the "great middle" between the 109 assured votes in the House for aiding Savimbi and the 101 known votes aligned against him.

Savimbi's public relations advisers told him in November that it was no longer a question of whether he would get U.S. assistance, but simply a matter of when, and in what form. During December, one significant public relations coup Savimbi had been waiting for was realized: The president agreed to meet with him in the Oval Office. There also would be an opportunity to meet later with reporters, with the White House as the backdrop.

"The issues of who is Jonas Savimbi and should the United States assist UNITA have now been cast," his public relations counselors told him, adding, "your trip will answer those questions for official Washington and the media."

The whirlwind of appearances, interviews and speeches began on Jan. 29, the day after Savimbi arrived at Dulles International Airport on a private jet.

From the outset, Savimbi was told by key conservatives that the president and his national security advisers already had decided to go forward with a covert assistance program. But he was also told that his performance in front of his critics and supporters would help cement political support to go forward.

According to well-informed sources, Shultz met with Republican Senate leaders at the White House a week before Savimbi's arrival and "took umbrage" that he was perceived to be against providing aid to Savimbi. Shultz told Senate leaders that he preferred a covert assistance program to an open one because of the diplomatic complications that would arise from trying to supply Savimbi through neighboring black African countries, according to these sources.

Shultz also told the Senate Republicans, however, that he needed "an expression of congressional support" to give the administration the political mandate it needed to begin supplying covert assistance to Savimbi as a hedge against potential opposition in the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees.

Under law, the executive branch does not need congressional approval to conduct covert operations through the CIA. But in going forward with a controversial Angola program, the administration runs the risk of another congressional rebellion such as those that led to the Clark amendment in 1976 and the Boland amendment blocking aid to Nicaraguan rebels in 1984.

Shultz's private request of the Republican leadership has been interpreted in congressional circles as an attempt by the Reagan administration to give itself "political coverage."

Senate Majority Leader Dole, according to several sources, took the lead in orchestrating the required political support in Congress. To that end, Dole's staff rewrote—in close consultation with Savimbi's public relations advisers—a Senate resolution first introduced last December. The new draft stated: ". . . the president should provide timely assistance critical to UNITA."

Some officials hoped the resolution could be introduced this past week to crown Savimbi's visit. But the resolution ran aground because of concern by Senate conservatives that their efforts could be sidetracked by State's Africa bureau.

On Tuesday, according to one source, the Republican Senate Steering Committee asked Dole to delay his resolution until the CIA had begun providing antitank and antiaircraft weapons to Savimbi. The steering committee staff members feared that once the Senate resolution was passed, the State Department might stall the covert aid program to give more time to negotiators in southern Africa.

This fear was articulated again

Wednesday when Dole sponsored a private lunch for Savimbi and about a dozen senators, most of them conservatives, who also expressed mistrust of Shultz's aides in charge of Africa policy: Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker and his deputy, Frank G. Wisner.

These senators asked Dole to again seek a firm assurance from Shultz that once the Senate resolution was passed, the administration would go forward immediately to supply Savimbi with weapons to counter the threat of a Soviet-backed offensive expected in April or May.

Dole and a number of conservative senators conveyed to Shultz on Thursday their reservations about supporting a resolution without a firm administration commitment to back Savimbi, according to well-informed sources. These senators said that without such assurance, they would introduce new measures calling for open military support for Savimbi.

Shultz then met with Savimbi Thursday evening and reaffirmed his commitment to the covert aid program, according to knowledgeable sources. The secretary is expected to give the same assurance to Dole.

With the Senate in recess, Republican sources said Dole will spend the next week lining up a solid majority to give the administration the political cover it seeks to begin the operation. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing is scheduled for Feb. 18 on Dole's resolution and Republican sources said Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) has pledged to work closely with Dole to move the resolution to the floor for a vote.

By the first weeks in March, one confident Savimbi backer said, "It will just be a matter of backing up the forklift in some warehouse, putting the weapons on an airplane and then trucking them in to Savimbi."

The Washington Times

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1985

ORRIN HATCH

Time is running out for UNITA

In July this year Congress repealed the Clark Amendment which had prohibited U.S. support to Angola's freedom fighters, known as UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), who have been courageously fighting the Soviet-supported MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) for 10 years without one dollar of U.S. aid.

Repeal of the Clark Amendment was a historic shift from a weak-kneed approach to foreign policy to an endorsement of the Reagan Doctrine. The time has come to translate this legislative mandate into action. Regrettably, this is easier said than done, because aid to UNITA has now become a political football.

Although the administration and Congress agree in principle that the United States should support Angola's freedom fighters, there are sharp disagreements over the type of aid we should provide (military or humanitarian, overt or covert) and the timing of this aid.

George Shultz has said that any form of U.S. aid right now would be "ill-timed" because it would jeopardize the negotiations between the United States and the MPLA aimed at getting Cuban troops to withdraw from Angola and achieving a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

President Reagan was asked recently why Mr. Shultz opposes aid to UNITA. *The New York Times* reports that the president replied, "I'm glad you asked that. He isn't. We all believe that a covert operation would be useful to us and have more chance of success right now than the overt proposal that has been made in Congress." Meanwhile, on Nov. 25, a group of 101 members of Congress, led by Democratic Rep. Howard Wolpe of Michigan, wrote President Reagan urging him not to provide covert aid to UNITA.

Tragically, the freedom-loving people of Angola are the ones who pay the price for U.S. inaction or delay. During the five years of negotiations between the United States and the Angolan government, the level of Cuban troops in Angola has increased, to about 35,000. While Chester Crocker was negotiating with the MPLA in Lusaka last month, the Soviets and their puppets were moving tons of military hardware into Angola for a major, new offensive. The State Department's insistence on deferring U.S. aid in order to try to produce a positive result from the negotiations is a dangerous strategy if it fails. While we talk, the Cubans arm. While we vacillate, Angolan freedom fighters face destruction. Although Mr. Crocker believes the Lusaka talks were "very useful," he is a notorious optimist.

In spite of a massive infusion of Soviet-bloc aid to the MPLA — exceeding $2 billion during the last two years, according to the U.S. State Department — Jonas Savimbi's forces reportedly control one-third of Angola and maintain a fighting force of 26,000 regulars and 34,000 guerrillas. Impressively, UNITA blunted a major MPLA offensive this fall north of Mavinga, a key UNITA stronghold. The Angolan freedom fighters can be successful in achieving their goal. They are willing to do the fighting. The least we can do is send them the few surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank weapons they need so desperately. Angola's freedom fighters have done a tremendous job in recent years, but they cannot hold off the MPLA much longer without outside support.

According to a communique from UNITA's president, Jonas Savimbi, to UNITA's representative in the United States, Figueiredo Paulo, a new Soviet offensive against UNITA has begun. UNITA sources report that one week ago Soviet IL-76 and AN-26 transport planes averaged 15 flights a day from Lubito and Luanda to Cuito Cuanavale, delivering an entire squadron of Hind helicopter gunships and numerous T-55 tanks as well as fuel, ammunition, light armored vehicles, and artillery to the 6,000 MPLA troops and 1,000 Cuban troops amassed there. According to the American Angolan Public Affairs Council, a force of at least 10 jet fighter bombers began bombing forward UNITA positions near Cuito Cuanavale — which is only 200 miles from UNITA's base at Jamba — on Friday, Dec. 6. UNITA officials believe the MPLA is preparing for a major offensive designed to seize Jamba.

Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole's resolution supporting UNITA is fine, as far as it goes, and it enjoys wide bipartisan support. It states that if MPLA intransigence continues, "the U.S. Senate would support material assistance critical to UNITA early in 1986." Although MPLA intransigence almost certainly will continue, that eternal optimist Chester Crocker wants to make one more effort to negotiate with the MPLA — thereby delaying the U.S. material assistance that Bob Dole has in mind. One more try for peace is fine, even if doomed, but it should be the last, even for Mr. Crocker.

Jonas Savimbi's goal — and our goal — in Angola, is to pressure the MPLA into negotiations with UNITA, leading to free elections as promised by the 1975 Alvor Agreement, which the MPLA abrogated. In the absence of military leverage, the MPLA has no incentive to negotiate seriously on Cuban troop withdrawal. U.S. aid to UNITA will strengthen the hand of the moderates within the MPLA government who seek a negotiated settlement.

The best way to help UNITA's cause is to send tangible U.S. support as quickly as possible.

Orrin G. Hatch is a Republican senator from Utah.

ORRIN HATCH

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Why we should aid Savimbi

Sanford Ungar wrote recently in *The Washington Post* that Jonas Savimbi, the charismatic leader of Angola's freedom fighters, is a "bad bet." Mr. Ungar, who is a well-known liberal activist masquerading as a journalist, is flat out, unequivocally *wrong*.

Not only is Mr. Savimbi a good bet, he and his forces, known as UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), are the key to turning back the Soviet assault on southern Africa.

The pivotal flaw of Mr. Ungar's analysis is that he does not see the war in Angola for what it is — a struggle against Soviet colonialism — but as a "civil war" unrelated to U.S. national security interests. Mr. Ungar says UNITA is undeserving of U.S. support and that Mr. Savimbi's forces cannot win. He is wrong on both counts.

How can any clear-thinking person describe a war waged against an indigenous population by 35,000 armed Cuban invaders assisted by several thousand Soviet and East German "advisers" as a civil war?

According to the U.S. State Department, in the last 18 months the Soviets have unloaded some *$2 billion* worth of military hardware in Angola, including MiG-23 and MiG-21 jets, MiG-24 helicopter gunships (the same weapon they use in their genocidal assault against the Afghan people) and T-62 and T-55 tanks, as well as trucks and armored personnel carriers.

Without Cuban troops and a massive amount of weapons supplied by the Soviet bloc, the illegitimate MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) regime would collapse tomorrow.

Mr. Ungar's portrayal of Mr. Savimbi as an "opportunist" is shameful. I have had the privilege of meeting Mr. Savimbi and have been exremely impressed by his honesty, integrity, religious commitment, and knowledge of international affairs. He is a renowned statesman who insists on sharing the same dangers and hardships as his troops. During his 20 years of fighting to liberate Angola, first from Portuguese control and later from the MPLA, he has traversed at least 30,000 kilometers on foot. He is an expert military strategist inspired by deeply held religious beliefs.

A hard-working man, Mr. Savimbi rises at 4 a.m. and dresses in army fatigues instead of flamboyant attire. His oratory skills are second to none. It is easy to see why Mr. Savimbi has won the love and admiration of his troops.

Under the heroic leadership of Mr. Savimbi and Brig. Gen. Tito Chingunga, UNITA has developed into an extremely effective fighting force. When some 20,000 Cuban troops launched the first MPLA offensive against Mr. Savimbi in February of 1976, UNITA had less than 5,000 fighters. By March, only 67 were left. MPLA army commmanders claimed that the remaining "pockets" of "bandit" resistance would be wiped out within a matter of days.

Today UNITA has 60,000 troops, including 34,000 guerrillas and 26,000 regulars, and controls a third of Angola.

Impressively, UNITA blunted a major two-pronged MPLA attack last fall — first at Cazombo, near the Angola-Zambia border, and then at Mavinga, a key UNITA stronghold only 200 miles northwest of its base at Jamba in southwestern Angola.

Mr. Savimbi reports that the assault was directly coordinated by Soviet officers, 15 to a brigade. Their aim was to continue their drive and crush Jamba itself. More than 5,000 MPLA soldiers drove toward Mavinga, fully equipped with armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, and air cover. Outnumbering the MPLA forces 4-to-1, UNITA forces surrounded the MPLA and halted the offensive 17 miles northwest of Mavinga.

Mr. Savimbi captures two-thirds of his weapons from the MPLA, so overall, UNITA is doing well in terms of weapons and supplies. However, like the Afghan mujahideen and the Nicaraguan "contras," Mr. Savimbi's freedom fighters desperately need anti-aircraft weapons to defend themselves against Soviet Hind helicopter gunships. These "flying tanks" are equipped with heavy machine guns and can fire anti-tank missiles and drop bombs.

Mr. Savimbi has said that if UNITA had had enough anti-aircraft missiles when the Soviets attacked Mavinga last October, his forces could have destroyed the entire Soviet high command. So the amount of aid needed to tip the scales in UNITA's favor is small compared to its potential returns.

Mr. Ungar calls Mr. Savimbi an "anti-capitalist, anti-American revolutionary." To the contrary, Mr. Savimbi advocates a mixed economy in which the peasants, not the state, own farm land.

The MPLA's wholesale nationalization program has transformed the once-thriving Angolan economy into a nightmare. Formerly a food exporter, Angola must now import a large portion of its food, while its diamond and gold mines, which once

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Jonas Savimbi

made Angola a wealthy country, are losing money. As Mr. Savimbi has stated, "Only the Communists could turn gold mining into a losing proposition."

Mr. Ungar's apparent sympathy for Gulf-Chevron, which reportedly pumps $1.5 billion directly into the illegitimate MPLA regime, defies logic. It is Gulf Oil — not UNITA — that should be questioned about its commitment to freedom. Congress should investigate the implications of Gulf's operations in Cabinda, Angola's oil-rich province, in light of U.S. policy interests in the region.

Mr. Savimbi's goal is to pressure the MPLA into negotiation with UNITA, leading to free elections with a guarantee that the winner of the elections will govern Angola. It was the MPLA — not UNITA — which abrogated the 1975 Alvor agreement, signed by the Portuguese, UNITA, the FNLA, and the MPLA, guaranteeing free elections.

U.S. aid will strengthen the hand of moderates within the MPLA government who seek a negotiated settlement and provide the MPLA with an incentive to end the war. If and when a negotiated settlement is reached, we will welcome Angola back into the world economy.

The battle for Angola is *not* a "civil war." It is a battle over ideologies: Soviet totalitarianism vs. freedom, self-determination, and democracy. U.S. aid to UNITA will send a strong signal to the world that the Reagan Doctrine is not mere words, that we are determined to help freedom fighters resist Communist hegemony.

If we turn a deaf ear to UNITA at this critical moment, other southern African nations will believe that we have abandoned them to the Soviets, just as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938. It would be disastrous to the West for southern Africa — which contains vital strategic minerals and controls the Cape Sea route — to come under Soviet control.

Last July, Congress sent a strong political message by its overwhelming repeal of the 1976 Clark Amendment which prohibited aid to UNITA. The next logistical step is to translate this legislative mandate into action.

I have written a letter to President Reagan urging him to use his authority under the McCollum Amendment to make available nonlethal excess Department of Defense supplies to UNITA. Through my own private contacts with Mr. Savimbi, he has expressed a keen interest in obtaining such supplies for his forces.

This initiative would send a clear message to the people of Angola and the friends of freedom everywhere that the Reagan Doctrine is not mere rhetoric, that we back our expressions of solidarity with freedom fighters with tangible support.

The geopolitical stakes are enormous; the moral choice is clear. It would be a grave mistake to send Mr. Savimbi home empty-handed.